Status: Forward institutional design / public working blueprint. Constitutional and legal conclusions remain governed by the separately published constitutional and legal research. This page does not announce a final constitution or claim present governmental authority.
Transition sequence: several clocks, not one proclamation
The Third Republic roadmap treats constitutional transition as a sequence of separately auditable stages. Legal validity, institutional seating, operational activation, first substantive output and ordinary accountability are different states. Rights restoration, local authorization, national representation, executive normalization, security-sector normalization and constitutional settlement should therefore be tracked separately rather than compressed into a single “transition complete” date.
Temporary authority
Any temporary authority should identify its source of delegation, mission boundary, usable powers and resources, reporting duties, automatic sunset, reauthorization rule, oversight and handover obligations at the moment authority is created. Authority should attach to defined missions rather than personalities. Control of media, databases, finances, premises or security resources must not be treated as proof of representative authority.
ROC constitutional continuity and security-sector transition — FCM proposal
FCM policy proposal: If the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) loses effective governing power in mainland China, the transition should proceed through a Republic of China (ROC (Taiwan)) constitutional-continuity framework rather than through an unbounded military or revolutionary authority. Any deployment of ROC armed forces into mainland areas during such a transition would require authorization through the competent constitutional and legal institutions, defined civilian objectives, geographic and temporal limits, reporting duties, and judicial and legislative oversight.
The proposed mission of such forces would be limited to public-order and constitutional-transition functions: protection of civilians, prevention of armed fragmentation, safeguarding of essential infrastructure and records, protection of courts and public institutions, and support for the transfer of security functions to lawful civilian government. This blueprint does not treat the ROC Constitution as containing an automatic or self-executing authorization for a present-day military deployment into mainland China.
The constitutional grounding for this proposal is instead the existing ROC framework in which the President commands the armed forces; national defense is organized by law; the armed forces must stand outside personal, regional and party relationships and owe loyalty to the state and people; and no political party or individual may use armed force as an instrument of political struggle. The current Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area also distinguishes the “Taiwan Area” from the “Mainland Area,” defining the latter, for purposes of that Act, as ROC territory outside the Taiwan Area. These provisions provide a constitutional and statutory framework that FCM uses as a starting point for its transition design, but they do not by themselves settle every question of deployment authority, territorial application, emergency powers, or post-CCP constitutional settlement.
- PLA depoliticization and nationalization. The People’s Liberation Army would cease to function as a CCP party-army. CCP political command structures inside the armed forces—including party committees, political-work command chains and other party organizations exercising military authority—would be removed from the military chain of command.
- Personnel transition. PLA personnel would not be treated collectively as political offenders. Individual personnel could be screened under law, with due process. Those eligible for continued service could enter a national armed force under civilian defense authority after accepting the constitutional order and a state, rather than party, oath of loyalty. Allegations of serious crimes would be handled through lawful investigation and adjudication.
- Unified civilian command. Armed forces operating during the transition would be subordinated to civilian constitutional authority and a professional Ministry of National Defense, with auditable command, detention, procurement and rules-of-engagement systems.
- CCP as a political party. The CCP could continue to exist and participate in lawful political life provided it relinquishes control of armed forces, maintains no armed wing, accepts the constitutional and electoral order, and does not organize or support violent resistance to the restoration process.
- No permanent military rule. Military deployment would be transitional and mission-bounded. Civil administration, policing, courts and elected institutions would assume authority according to published readiness and handover criteria.
Legal references: ROC Constitution arts. 36, 137–139; Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, arts. 1–2. This section states an FCM transition proposal and should not be read as a claim that the present ROC government has adopted it or that existing law already resolves every legal question necessary to implement it.
Executive, legislative and judicial architecture
The current design direction separates executive execution, representative authorization and legal review. A temporary executive should operate only within enumerated authority and an approved budget or lawful continuity mechanism. Representative bodies should review extension or expansion of temporary powers and major public commitments. Courts—or a narrowly bounded temporary review mechanism where ordinary courts cannot yet function—must be able to reject unlawful restrictions, jurisdictional excess and abuse of public authority. The temporary reviewing body must itself have a fixed composition, duration, reason-giving duty and transfer path to ordinary courts.
Checks, balances and emergency safeguards
- Temporary powers expire automatically unless lawfully renewed.
- Renewal is a new act of power and requires a fresh factual and legal basis.
- Representative review and legal/judicial review operate independently.
- Military, police, detention, communications and financial powers require distinct authority and audit chains.
- Major emergency orders should carry identifiers, scope, effective and expiry times, executing units, review status and public remedy channels.
- Dissent and minority risk warnings should be preserved rather than erased by the prevailing decision.
Institutional activation
A constitution, law or appointment can be legally valid before an institution is staffed, funded, procedurally enabled or capable of producing a public output. The blueprint therefore proposes an activation ledger: adoption or ratification → promulgation → legal effective date → institution seated → operational activation → first substantive output → first ordinary accountability interaction. Oversight institutions require the same evidence of activation; the existence of an oversight clause alone does not prove oversight is functioning.
Available blueprints and interfaces
Related published material: Transition Readiness and Roadmap, KPIs & Review Gates. Constitutional evidence and legal research remain separately published under Constitution, Law & Justice and the Third Republic historical/research foundation.
Open legal/design questions
Open legal question: the precise lawful basis and limits for temporary fiscal payments, utility continuity, emergency procurement and necessary regulatory functions remain unresolved. The same caution applies to any cross-strait deployment, territorial extension of administration, emergency military authority, integration of former PLA personnel and transfer of command. This blueprint may design operational controls, but operational necessity does not manufacture missing legal authority. Final choices concerning constitutional continuity, amendment or replacement, branch structure and emergency-law boundaries require lawful representative and legal resolution.