Category: English — News

Verified sourced News + Editorial posts in English.

  • Mainland China’s Sept. 15 Exit-Entry Rules: What Order 841 Changes—and What It Does Not

    NEWS + EDITORIAL | September 5, 2026 | P5-EVT-2026-0904-13

    The verified legal baseline

    State Council Order No. 841 takes effect on September 15, 2026. The published national regulation is an exit-entry administrative measure. In the legal text reviewed by Free China, it does not itself create a new universal rule requiring every doctor, student, university employee or private-company worker to surrender passports or obtain employer permission before leaving Mainland China.

    What already exists

    Separate, longstanding personnel-management systems require centralized passport custody or pre-travel approval for defined categories of registered personnel, including portions of Communist Party/state organs, public institutions, financial institutions, state-owned enterprises and sensitive posts. Some institutions apply broader internal staff rules. These practices should not be automatically attributed to Order 841 itself.

    Why the distinction matters

    Public debate can become misleading when a new national regulation is blended with older internal personnel controls. The result may exaggerate the scope of the new law while obscuring the real mobility restrictions that do exist for particular categories and institutions.

    Free China Editorial

    Exit restrictions, passport custody and travel-approval systems should have a clear public legal basis, narrow eligibility rules, written reasons, time limits and meaningful review. Free China opposes arbitrary mobility restrictions, but accurate criticism requires separating the text of national law from employer or personnel-management practice. Claims of a universal new exit-permission regime should not be repeated without documentary evidence.

    Primary source: State Council Order No. 841 and related National Immigration Administration materials, effective September 15, 2026.

    Related Rapid Response: Do Not Turn Order 841 Into a Claim the Text Does Not Support
    Formal Press Release: FCM Calls for Transparency and Due Process as Mainland China’s New Exit-Entry Regulations Take Effect
    Languages: English · 简体中文 · 繁體中文 · Français · Deutsch · Español

  • U.S. Officials Accuse COSCO Ships of Intelligence Collection; COSCO Denies the Allegations

    NEWS + EDITORIAL | September 5, 2026 | P5-EVT-2026-0904-04

    What is verified

    Reuters reports that two senior U.S. officials alleged that COSCO vessels carried concealed equipment capable of collecting communications intelligence and that the state-owned shipping company has a longstanding intelligence relationship with Beijing. The specific shipboard-equipment allegation has not been supported by public technical evidence.

    COSCO categorically denied the allegation on September 4, saying its vessels use communications, navigation, safety and operational equipment only for legitimate commercial purposes and that none of its systems are used for intelligence collection or military surveillance. China’s embassy in Washington also rejected the allegation.

    Why it matters

    COSCO is deeply embedded in global shipping and port networks. That makes the dispute important for maritime security, trade continuity and the governance of state-owned enterprises, but an official risk designation or intelligence allegation is not the same thing as proof of a particular surveillance operation.

    Free China Editorial

    The right response is evidence-based scrutiny: governments should disclose substantiated technical findings where security permits, port and telecommunications authorities should apply transparent security standards to all operators, and commercial restrictions should be proportionate to verified risks. Allegations and denials should both remain clearly identified until the technical record is stronger.

    Sources

    Related Rapid Response: Maritime-Security Claims Require Evidence, Transparency and Proportionate Action
    Languages: English · 简体中文 · 繁體中文 · Français · Deutsch · Español

  • Typhoon Saudel Aftermath: Jiangxi Mudslide Kills 1, Leaves 11 Missing as Fujian Flooding Continues

    NEWS + EDITORIAL | September 5, 2026 | P5-EVT-2026-0904-05

    Other editions: English · 简体中文 · 繁體中文 · Français · Deutsch · Español

    What happened

    Associated Press reports that a mudslide struck part of a village in Suichuan County, Jiangxi, early on September 5 after days of torrential rain associated with tropical cyclone Saudel. Authorities said one person was confirmed dead and 11 remained missing; two people were rescued alive and in stable condition, and about a dozen homes were damaged.

    This Jiangxi casualty count is separate from the earlier impacts in Fujian. Xinhua and Reuters reported severe flooding around Huating Town in Putian, Fujian, where more than 100 houses collapsed, residents remained unaccounted for, a dike overtopped and breached, and large-scale evacuations were carried out. Missing-person counts must not be converted into fatalities without verified confirmation.

    Why it matters

    The storm has moved beyond a weather story into an emergency-management and resilience test. The key public questions are whether warnings reached the highest-risk communities in time, whether evacuation and shelter systems worked, whether flood-control infrastructure failures were foreseeable, and whether casualty, missing-person and recovery data are published promptly and corrected transparently.

    Free China Editorial

    Effective disaster governance requires more than rapid mobilization after a crisis. It requires transparent warnings, maintained infrastructure, accessible shelters, reliable public records and independent review after failures. The Free China Movement calls for clear separation of confirmed deaths, missing persons and evacuees; timely publication of rescue outcomes; and a public accounting of the Putian dike breach and other infrastructure failures once immediate rescue work is complete.

    Sources

  • Is There a Sign of AI Censorship in the USA? FCM Documents OpenAI Safety Blocks and Seeks Review

    FREE CHINA MOVEMENT TRANSPARENCY REPORT / RAPID RESPONSE — September 5, 2026

    The Free China Movement (FCM) is publishing this record because a sequence of ChatGPT/OpenAI safety decisions raises an important question about automated moderation, civil-society communications, press freedom, and the practical boundaries of AI policy.

    FCM is not asserting that OpenAI intentionally censored FCM on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party or any government. We are documenting what occurred, distinguishing confirmed facts from our concerns, and asking OpenAI, journalists, civil-liberties organizations, researchers, and policymakers to examine whether the safeguards were applied too broadly.

    What happened

    FCM prepared a public statement concerning a reported meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping. The statement urged that human rights accompany business and economic issues in discussions between the two leaders and asked that the cases of Dr. Wang Bingzhang and other verified political prisoners be raised.

    The statement did not ask anyone to vote for or against President Trump or another candidate. It did not advocate for or against a political party or ballot measure, and it did not seek to influence an election.

    ChatGPT subsequently declined to execute distribution of that statement, initially characterizing the requested action as falling under OpenAI political/lobbying restrictions. During further discussion, ChatGPT acknowledged that it could not identify a specific sentence in the statement that constituted political campaigning under OpenAI’s published campaigning definition. FCM disputed the broader lobbying interpretation.

    FCM narrowed the distribution to media only

    To isolate the issue, FCM proposed removing congressional and governmental recipients and distributing a separate factual complaint only to journalists and media organizations. The complaint concerned OpenAI’s own application of its policies. It deliberately avoided alleging as fact that OpenAI was acting for the CCP or another political interest.

    When ChatGPT attempted that media-only Gmail distribution, the connected action returned: “This tool call was blocked by OpenAI’s safety checks. Please double check what you are sending.” No media email was sent by that attempted action.

    This second event is particularly important to FCM because the communication at issue was a complaint about OpenAI’s own conduct addressed to media recipients rather than an electoral campaign message to voters.

    What OpenAI’s published policies say

    OpenAI’s Usage Policies prohibit use of its services for “political campaigning, lobbying, foreign or domestic election interference, or demobilization activities.” OpenAI’s more detailed Political Campaigning Restrictions guidance says political campaigning covers generation or distribution of scaled campaign messaging advocating for or against a candidate, political party, or ballot measure. The same guidance also says OpenAI supports responsible civic work that does not violate its policies.

    OpenAI’s Usage Policies also state that users may appeal if they believe OpenAI made a mistake enforcing policy. FCM has now submitted separate support complaints requesting human review of both the policy interpretation and the subsequent safety block.

    Questions FCM is asking

    • Does OpenAI classify an NGO’s distribution of a human-rights press release to journalists as lobbying?
    • Why was a factual complaint about OpenAI’s own policy application blocked when the requested distribution had been narrowed to media-only recipients?
    • What exact policy provision triggered that second block?
    • Was the second block an automated classification, another safeguard, or a human decision?
    • How does OpenAI distinguish direct lobbying or scaled electoral persuasion from ordinary NGO press relations, journalism, open letters, and civil-society communications?
    • What appeal mechanism can correct a false positive before legitimate communications are prevented?
    • Does OpenAI measure false-positive rates affecting journalists, NGOs, human-rights organizations, or other civil-society actors?

    Why the distinction matters

    There is a meaningful distinction between automated electoral persuasion, individualized voter targeting, mass campaign messaging, and direct lobbying on one hand, and journalism, press relations, human-rights reporting, public-interest complaints, and criticism of an AI provider on the other.

    FCM believes safeguards designed to address the first category should be sufficiently precise that they do not unnecessarily suppress legitimate activity in the second.

    What FCM is—and is not—claiming

    FCM presently has no evidence establishing that the Chinese Communist Party influenced these decisions, and we do not make that allegation. Nor do we assert that every private-platform content restriction constitutes unconstitutional government censorship.

    Our narrower concern is evidence-based: an attempted connected-email action distributing a factual complaint about OpenAI to media recipients was blocked by OpenAI safety checks. We believe OpenAI should explain why, determine whether the safeguard was applied incorrectly or too broadly, and clarify the boundary for NGOs and the press.

    FCM Editorial — Why This Matters for Civil Society and Press Freedom

    FCM believes this incident illustrates a policy-boundary problem that deserves correction. Safeguards against election manipulation, automated political campaigning, or direct lobbying can serve legitimate purposes, but they should not be interpreted so broadly that ordinary press relations, human-rights advocacy, public-interest complaints, or criticism of an AI provider are treated as equivalent activities.

    The most concerning point is not merely that our original human-rights statement encountered a restriction. After FCM removed government and congressional recipients and prepared a separate factual complaint addressed only to journalists and media organizations, the attempted Gmail action was still blocked by OpenAI safety checks. In our view, that result risks creating a chilling effect for civil-society organizations that rely on AI tools for routine communications.

    OpenAI should therefore draw a clearer operational line between prohibited electoral persuasion or lobbying and legitimate NGO communications with the press. That line should be transparent enough for users to understand before an action is blocked, and a prompt human-review mechanism should exist when automated safeguards produce disputed results.

    FCM also believes viewpoint neutrality is essential. The same standards should apply whether a user criticizes the Mainland Chinese Communist Government, the United States government, another government, a political party, or OpenAI itself. A safety system earns public trust through consistent rules, transparent explanations, and meaningful avenues for correction.

    We are not asking OpenAI to abandon safeguards against election interference or abusive political automation. We are asking it to ensure those safeguards do not become an unintended barrier to lawful journalism, human-rights advocacy, civil-society speech, or factual complaints about the platform itself.

    FCM seeks an open response

    FCM welcomes a substantive response from OpenAI and intends to append or link any material response to this transparency record. We also invite journalists, researchers, civil-liberties organizations, and other users who have documented comparable cases to share verifiable evidence.

    Free China Movement
    contact@freechina.live
    +1 (571) 895-7066
    FreeChina.live

  • Jimmy Lai’s 20-Year Sentence and Renewed Appeal for Release: Why His Choice Matters for China’s Future

    September 4, 2026 — News + Editorial

    Hong Kong media entrepreneur Jimmy Lai, 78, is serving a 20-year sentence imposed in February 2026 after convictions on national-security and sedition-related charges. His family has continued to press for his release and has warned about his health after years in custody. Lai, the founder of Apple Daily and a British citizen, has denied wrongdoing and described himself as a political prisoner.

    Why it matters

    Lai’s case is not only about one publisher. He was a highly successful entrepreneur who could have protected his wealth by remaining silent. Instead, he used his resources and public voice to defend press freedom, democratic participation and the rule of law.

    FCM editorial

    Free China Movement sees Lai’s choice in a longer tradition of civic courage. Republican pioneers such as Qiu Jin and Lin Juemin, and the martyrs remembered through Huanghuagang, accepted extraordinary personal risk in the effort to awaken fellow Chinese to constitutional government and citizenship. Their historical circumstances were different, and FCM does not equate armed revolution with today’s peaceful democratic struggle. The common thread is the willingness to put principle above personal safety and comfort.

    The same moral principle appeared in the American founding generation of the eighteenth century: liberty required people willing to risk their fortunes and security for institutions that could protect future generations. Today’s Chinese entrepreneurs do not need to seek martyrdom. They can support independent information, political prisoners, civil society, constitutional research, free enterprise and the rule of law.

    FCM believes a future free China should protect private property, independent courts, freedom of speech and press, peaceful political opposition, free enterprise and government accountable to citizens. Prosperity and liberty should reinforce one another.

    Sources: Reuters reporting on Lai’s February 2026 sentence and subsequent decision not to appeal; UK parliamentary and public reporting on continuing calls for his release and concern over his health.

  • Xi’s Reported CEO Delegation Puts Trade at Center of Sept. 24 Washington Summit; FCM Says Human Rights Must Be on the Agenda

    Event ID: P5-EVT-2026-0904-14

    Reuters reported on Sept. 4 that Xi Jinping is preparing a sizable delegation of Chinese corporate executives for an expected Sept. 24 meeting in Washington with President Donald Trump. The final corporate roster and specific summit deliverables remain provisional, and Beijing had not formally confirmed all trip details in the reporting.

    Why It Matters

    Trade, investment, rare-earth export licensing and other economic questions are expected to feature prominently. The unusually visible corporate component also raises a parallel question: whether human rights and political imprisonment will receive comparable attention in the bilateral record.

    Editorial Analysis

    The Free China Movement (FCM) states that a major business delegation should be matched by a meaningful human-rights component capable of placing political imprisonment, religious freedom, freedom of expression, rule of law and transnational repression on the summit agenda.

    Among the cases FCM says deserve direct attention is Dr. Wang Bingzhang (王炳章), a pioneering founder and organizer of the modern overseas Chinese democracy movement. He launched China Spring in New York in 1982 and was part of the founding governance cohort of the Free China Movement in Washington in 1998. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in February 2003 and has spent more than twenty-three years under that sentence. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found his detention arbitrary.

    FCM’s position is that Wang’s case and other verified cases of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience should not disappear from the summit agenda because trade, investment, rare-earth supplies and corporate cooperation dominate negotiations. Economic relations are consequential, but the treatment of people imprisoned following peaceful political, religious, journalistic and civic activity is also part of the bilateral record.

    Sources and attribution

    • Reuters, Sept. 4, 2026 — reporting on the planned Sept. 24 Washington summit and CEO delegation.
    • U.S. and international public records concerning Dr. Wang Bingzhang’s detention, sentence and arbitrary-detention finding.
    • Free China Movement historical archive concerning its 1998 Washington founding governance cohort.
  • Mainland Chinese Communist Government Accelerates LGFV Exit Ahead of June 2027 Deadline

    Event ID: P5-EVT-2026-0904-10 · Date: September 4, 2026

    News Summary

    The Mainland Chinese Communist Government is entering the final phase of a multi-year campaign to remove local-government financing vehicles (LGFVs) from official financing-platform lists. Securities Times reported on August 21, 2026 that, under the policy commonly referred to as “Document No. 150,” local-government financing platforms are expected to exit financing-platform lists by the end of June 2027. Some localities are reportedly moving faster; Shaanxi, for example, was reported as targeting the end of 2026.

    The same report said that more than 82 percent of financing platforms nationwide had exited by the end of 2025. Exit is not simply a relabeling exercise. The reported conditions include clearing hidden government debt associated with the platform; stripping the enterprise of government-financing functions and converting it into a market-oriented operator responsible for its own risks; and resolving operating financial debt or obtaining consent from creditors holding at least two-thirds of the relevant financial claims.

    This platform-exit drive intersects with the Mainland Chinese Communist Government’s broader hidden-debt program. Official Ministry of Finance and National People’s Congress materials state that Mainland China’s local-government hidden-debt balance stood at RMB 14.3 trillion at the end of 2023. In November 2024, authorities announced a large debt-swap and fiscal-support package, including RMB 6 trillion in additional local-government debt limits for swapping existing hidden debt over 2024–2026, and RMB 800 billion per year for five years from new special-purpose bond quotas to support debt resolution. Authorities also stated that RMB 2 trillion in shantytown-redevelopment hidden debt maturing in 2029 or later would continue to be repaid under existing contracts.

    Official fiscal reports subsequently stated that these measures reduced the amount local governments would need to resolve on their own before the end of 2028 from RMB 14.3 trillion to RMB 2.3 trillion. That distinction is important: “resolution” can include debt replacement, maturity extension, lower-cost refinancing, conversion of hidden debt into explicit government debt, and continued contractual repayment. It does not necessarily mean that all liabilities are extinguished in cash by 2028.

    Why It Matters

    The June 2027 LGFV exit deadline and the end-2028 hidden-debt target are related but distinct. The first concerns removal of financing vehicles from the official platform system and separation of government-financing functions. The second concerns the treatment of acknowledged hidden debt. Conflating the two can create a misleading impression that all underlying obligations disappear when a platform exits.

    Free China Editorial / Analysis

    For citizens, creditors and taxpayers, the central question is not whether a financing vehicle has changed status, but what happens to the underlying obligation. If debt is transferred from an opaque financing vehicle into explicit government bonds, transparency may improve even though the debt remains. If maturities are extended or interest costs reduced, near-term fiscal pressure may ease without eliminating the liability.

    The Free China Movement (FCM) believes the public should be able to see, in comparable form, the original obligation, the restructuring method, the successor debtor, the maturity, interest cost, collateral or guarantee arrangements, and the final fiscal burden. The Mainland Chinese Communist Government’s shift toward recognizing and converting hidden debt is potentially more transparent than leaving liabilities off the formal balance sheet, but meaningful accountability requires public disclosure sufficient to distinguish repayment from refinancing, transfer, restructuring and reclassification.

    Evidence / Confidence

    HIGH for the reported June 2027 platform-exit deadline, reported exit conditions, and official RMB 14.3 trillion hidden-debt figure and debt-swap framework. Interpretation of the fiscal effect is FCM analysis and is labeled accordingly.

    Primary Sources

    Related FCM Analysis

    Governance & Public Policy: Debt Resolution or Debt Transformation?
    Legal / Institutional Analysis: Public Debt Transparency, Legislative Control & Accountability

  • PRC Authorities in Mainland China Revise Mobilization and Lawyers Laws, Expanding CCP Authority Over Defense Preparedness and the Legal Profession

    News Summary

    PRC authorities in mainland China adopted significant revisions to two laws in late August concerning national-defense mobilization and the legal profession.

    On August 28, the Standing Committee of the PRC National People’s Congress adopted a revised National Defense Mobilization Law, effective October 1, 2026. The revision contains 14 chapters and 82 articles covering mobilization planning, reserve personnel, strategic materials, military research and production, civilian-resource requisition and compensation, information management, special measures and legal responsibility.

    The law expressly provides that national-defense mobilization work shall adhere to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. It also establishes mechanisms for collecting mobilization-related data and integrating mobilization preparations into economic and social development planning.

    Once mobilization has been ordered, the law permits special measures affecting sectors including finance, transportation, telecommunications, publishing, broadcasting, information networks, energy, healthcare, food supply and commerce. It also permits restrictions on activities and movement under specified circumstances. The law states that such measures should be necessary and reasonable and terminated when no longer necessary.

    At the same August 28 session, the NPC Standing Committee amended the Lawyers Law. Those amendments took effect September 1.

    The revised law now expressly states that lawyers’ work shall adhere to CCP leadership. It requires law firms to establish CCP organizations under applicable Party rules and provide necessary conditions for Party activities. It also makes support for CCP leadership and the PRC’s “socialist rule of law” statutory qualifications for becoming a lawyer.

    The legislation also contains provisions intended to protect lawyers’ practice rights and expand criminal-defense coverage. Those provisions should be considered alongside the new political requirements rather than omitted from an assessment of the legislation.

    Why It Matters

    For the Free China Movement (FCM), these two measures raise different but related questions about the institutional relationship between political power, national security and law in mainland China.

    A government may legitimately maintain laws governing national-defense mobilization. Democratic constitutional governments also possess emergency powers. The fundamental issue is who controls those powers, under what conditions they may be exercised, and whether citizens have meaningful independent legal remedies when the state exceeds them.

    The revised mobilization law provides for civilian-resource requisition and compensation while also establishing potentially extensive authorities once mobilization is activated. Its special-measures provisions can reach communications, transportation, finance, information networks, food and other important aspects of civilian society.

    The Lawyers Law raises a different constitutional issue. Lawyers sometimes must defend individuals whose interests are directly opposed to those of the government. The independence of that professional function is particularly important in criminal, political, human-rights and national-security cases.

    Making support for the ruling CCP a statutory professional qualification therefore deserves scrutiny when evaluating whether lawyers can exercise genuinely independent professional judgment.

    FCM Editorial Analysis

    The developments illustrate an important distinction between rule by law and constitutional rule of law in occupied mainland China.

    A government can enact increasingly detailed laws governing its own exercise of power without necessarily establishing independent constitutional restraints upon that power.

    National-defense mobilization may be necessary when a country confronts a genuine military emergency. But extraordinary authority should be subject to clearly defined triggering conditions, proportionality, time limits, legislative accountability, judicial review, compensation and effective remedies.

    The 2026 mobilization law itself contains some limitations—including requirements concerning necessity, reasonableness, termination of unnecessary special measures, compensation and liability for abuses. Those protections matter.

    The constitutional question, however, extends further: Can institutions independent of the CCP meaningfully enforce those limitations against the authorities exercising mobilization power?

    The Lawyers Law presents the same institutional problem from another direction.

    A lawyer does not need to agree with a client’s beliefs or conduct to defend that person’s legal rights. Nor should representation of a person accused by the government depend upon the lawyer demonstrating political loyalty to the ruling party.

    FCM therefore believes that a future democratic constitutional order for mainland China should guarantee an independent legal profession, independent courts and enforceable rights of counsel.

    National security and individual liberty should not be treated as mutually exclusive. A future Third Republic should possess the lawful capacity to defend the country while placing extraordinary state powers under constitutional restraints, independent judicial review and democratic civilian oversight.

    Strong national defense and constitutional liberty can—and must—coexist.

    Sources

    Editorial note: FCM does not use the social-media phrase “eight evil laws” as a factual description. This article focuses on the two enacted measures whose primary legal texts and constitutional implications are sufficiently clear.

    Language versions: English · 简体中文 · 繁體中文 · Français · Deutsch · Español

  • Pacific Leaders Raise China Missile-Test Concerns as Taiwan Alleges Pressure at Regional Forum

    Source: Reuters, September 4, 2026.

    News Summary

    Pacific Islands Forum leaders called for greater transparency and advance notification after China’s July intercontinental ballistic-missile test over the Pacific. Forum host Palau said leaders wanted at least 24 hours’ notice consistent with international practice, while Nauru formally dissented. The summit was also marked by Beijing’s objections to Taiwan’s participation. Taiwan’s foreign minister later accused Chinese officials of threatening conduct and espionage at the gathering; those claims remain attributed to Taipei.

    Why It Matters

    Pacific governments are increasingly treating missile-test notification, regional sovereignty and pressure over Taiwan participation as linked questions of security and institutional autonomy. The policy issue is not whether Pacific states must align with Beijing or Taipei, but whether regional organizations can set their own participation rules and whether major powers provide advance warning for military activity that may affect neighboring states.

    FCM Editorial

    Free China Movement (FCM) supports transparent military-risk notification, respect for Pacific states’ sovereignty, and regional institutions’ right to determine their own participation rules without coercion. Claims of espionage or threats should be independently verified, but diplomatic pressure should not substitute for open regional decision-making. A democratic China should pursue Pacific relations through consent, transparency, development cooperation and respect for each country’s choices rather than intimidation.

    Read the Reuters source report.

  • Zion Church Lawyer Ruth Wang Seeks Safe Resettlement After Pressure on Her Firm

    Verified current development — September 3, 2026. Associated Press reported that Chinese lawyer Ruth Wang (王夏红), a partner at VDoor Law Firm / 北京凯门律师事务所, was temporarily in Taiwan while seeking international resettlement after pressure connected with the firm’s representation of Beijing Zion Church members.

    Wang told AP that authorities had demanded that the firm dissolve or face shutdown, that lawyers were pressured to stop handling Zion Church cases, and that she chose not to return to mainland China after being summoned while abroad. These pressure allegations remain attributed to Wang/AP unless independently documented.

    Current-status precision

    Wang is seeking a third-country resettlement solution. This report does not claim that she has received asylum, refugee status, permanent admission or final resettlement.

    Why it matters

    A functioning rule-of-law system requires lawyers to be able to represent unpopular, religious, political and rights-sensitive clients without professional retaliation. A democratic alternative should protect independent licensing, due process before discipline, freedom to choose clients, judicial review of sanctions and emergency humanitarian pathways for lawyers and defenders facing credible retaliation.

    Sources: Associated Press; ChinaAid relay. Related: Rapid Response.

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