Research series: State, Rights & Constitutional Research Series · Third Republic Governance Blueprints
自由社会需要什么制度保障？中国公民权利与国家权力边界的制度清单
This paper translates the historical and theoretical findings of Papers I and II into institutional design questions. It does not select a president over a parliament, a federation over a unitary system, or a single judicial model. Instead it identifies functions that any proposed constitutional arrangement must perform: limiting government, protecting basic rights, enabling independent review, regularizing opposition, authorizing taxation, controlling coercive institutions and allowing peaceful correction of political error.
Key findings
- Rights require both substantive protection and enforceable remedies.
- Rights limitations should have an identifiable legal basis, legitimate purpose, necessity and proportionality.
- Legislatures should combine representation, lawmaking, budget approval, deliberation and executive oversight.
- Opposition parties and legislative minorities require institutional space if political competition is to remain meaningful.
- Emergency powers require rules for declaration, renewal, termination, rights limitations and review.
- Fiscal transparency should include debt, significant liabilities, public-corporation finances and material fiscal risks, not merely a headline budget.
- No institution should possess final and unreviewable authority over all dimensions of public power.
Constitutional design checklist
- Constitutional supremacy
- Fundamental rights and enforceable remedies
- Structured rights limitations
- Independent judiciary and constitutional review
- Administrative justice
- Representative and effective legislature
- Accountable executive
- Protected political opposition
- Competitive elections and lawful transfer
- Local autonomy and vertical allocation of powers
- Constitutional command of armed forces
- Civilian policing and domestic-security law
- Professional public service
- Independent oversight bodies
- Tax authorization, budgeting, audit and fiscal transparency
- Emergency powers with review and expiry
- Amendment rules and institutional error-correction
Design principle
The objective is institutional resilience rather than institutional perfection. Constitutional design should remain protective when officeholders are mistaken, partisan, unpopular or self-interested. Different constitutional systems can implement these functions differently; the paper therefore compares institutional functions rather than ranking political actors or selecting a single national model.
Research note: This paper contains comparative institutional proposals, not statements of current law. It is cross-indexed under Governance & Public Policy because of its institutional-design focus.