The Machinery of Free Bargaining: Recognition, Strike Funds, and a Referee

Why machinery, not slogans. A right to bargain means nothing until law answers five mechanical questions: Who speaks for the workers? Whom must the employer face? When may pressure be applied, and when is it barred? Who pays for the weeks a strike lasts? And who referees? Free systems have spent a century building that machinery. This dossier takes it apart, because a Chinese labour movement that demands “collective bargaining” without demanding the machinery will be handed the words and denied the thing.

Recognition: one workforce, one voice

Under the US National Labor Relations Act (1935), workers choose their representative in a supervised election; the winner represents the whole bargaining unit exclusively, and the employer must bargain with it in good faith. Refusing to bargain is an unfair labour practice, judged by a standing board. The point is not the American model’s virtue — its defects are catalogued in this desk’s reading — the point is the sequence: representation is settled by the workers’ vote first, and negotiation follows from it, not from an employer’s or a ministry’s permission.

The German division of labour

Germany splits the work two ways. Sectoral unions (IG Metall, ver.di and their peers) negotiate industry agreements — Tarifverträge — with employer associations, under the coalition freedom of Article 9(3) of the Basic Law. Inside the plant, elected works councils hold co-determination rights but are barred from calling strikes. While an agreement runs, a peace obligation binds the union; when it expires, a strike ballot and the union’s strike fund — built from members’ dues, paying strike benefit week by week — make the threat of a stoppage a budgeted fact rather than a gesture. Law disciplines both sides: the employer faces a counterpart it cannot choose, and the union faces rules it cannot break without losing the law’s protection.

The ILO standard underneath

Convention 98, Article 4, requires measures “appropriate to national conditions” to encourage voluntary negotiation between employers and workers’ organisations. The ILO’s supervisory bodies have long treated strike action as an essential means by which workers’ organisations defend their interests under Convention 87 — restrictable only in narrow classes such as essential services in the strict sense. Machinery, in other words, is not a national taste. It is the content of the two conventions China refuses to ratify.

China: the form, without the machinery

China signs collective contracts by the million. What the Chronicle’s record shows is bargaining without the five answers: the workers’ side is the official union branch, often chaired under management’s shadow; no election settles who speaks; the 1982 Constitution struck out the freedom to strike that the 1975 and 1978 texts had named, and no statute since has protected a striker from dismissal. Workers strike anyway — Foshan Honda in 2010, Dongguan Yue Yuen in 2014 — and win, when they win, by disruption alone, each action beginning legally naked. The finding of this desk is exact: the demand is not “more collective contracts”. The demand is the machinery — recognition by workers’ vote, a duty to bargain, protected strike windows, strike funds, and a referee who is not the employer’s party.

Research dossier of the International Association of Chinese Workers — International Labour Law & Practice desk. Opened 30 October 2026.