After the Xinhai Revolution overthrew the Qing dynasty, China once faced another possibility: that a revolutionary leader might establish a new dynasty, or that the monarchy might be retained and a constitutional system introduced. Some people at the time did indeed think this way — a few years later, Yuan Shikai took the road of proclaiming himself emperor. But Sun Yat-sen firmly advocated a republic from the very beginning and opposed monarchy in any form. This was not a personal preference, but a conclusion determined by his diagnosis of the root cause of China’s political ills.
Sun Yat-sen’s basic judgment was this: China’s fundamental problem was not that “the emperor was bad,” but “the imperial system itself.” The rise and fall of successive dynasties proved a pattern: at the founding of a dynasty, government was relatively clean and clear; after a few generations, corruption and tyranny inevitably followed; in the end, the dynasty collapsed amid turmoil, and a new dynasty then repeated the same process. Changing the emperor or changing the dynasty changed only the ruler; it did not change the mode of rule. If the revolution merely overthrew the Qing dynasty and established another dynasty, that would be nothing more than one more repetition of a cycle of more than two thousand years. What Sun Yat-sen sought to break was precisely this cycle itself.
This was why he put forward the Three Principles of the People. In 1905, in the inaugural statement of Min Bao (The People’s Paper), the organ of the Tongmenghui, Sun Yat-sen systematically expounded the Three Principles of the People: the Principle of Nationalism, the Principle of Democracy, and the Principle of the People’s Livelihood (the original text of the inaugural statement listed six propositions, which were later summarised as the Three Principles of the People). Among them, the Principle of Democracy was republicanism — the proposition that state sovereignty belongs to the people, and that the government is authorised by the people and subject to the people’s supervision. However “enlightened” a new dynasty might be, its legitimacy would still derive from lineage and armed force, not from authorisation by the people, and this fundamentally conflicted with the Principle of Democracy. Advocating a republic, therefore, was not an expedient measure for Sun Yat-sen, but a logical necessity of the Three Principles of the People: without a republic, the Principle of Democracy would be an empty phrase.
I. Dynastic Succession: Treating the Symptoms, Not the Root Cause
Sun Yat-sen lived at the end of dynastic politics, and he saw with his own eyes that the Qing dynasty’s problem was not that any one emperor was especially bad, but that the entire system was no longer capable of renewing itself. Bureaucratic corruption, fiscal exhaustion, and humiliation at the hands of foreign powers — there was no way out of these problems within the dynastic framework. More importantly, dynastic politics had an insoluble problem of succession: to whom should the throne be passed? Throughout history, struggles over succession to the throne repeatedly triggered civil strife.
A new dynasty might perhaps bring a few decades of stability, but it could not answer the question, “By what right does the next emperor rule?” Sun Yat-sen’s conclusion was that as long as the source of supreme power remained bloodline and armed force, China could not escape the cycle of order and disorder. The significance of the republican system lay in the fact that it turned “who is to rule” into a question that could be answered by rules: elected by the people, produced in accordance with the law, and, upon expiry of the term of office, handed over in accordance with the law. Rules can be debated and can be amended, but they no longer need to be answered with bloodshed.
II. Why Not a Constitutional Monarchy?
Some may ask: why not follow Britain and Japan at the time, retain the emperor, and implement constitutional government? Sun Yat-sen’s consideration was a realistic one: monarchy in China had already completely lost its credibility. The “preparatory constitutionalism” of the late Qing dynasty proved to be a fraud — an imperial-clan cabinet and an imperially decreed outline of a constitution turned constitutional government into a tool for preserving the old rule. To retain monarchy against such a background would only leave a pretext for restoration.
History also confirmed his foresight. Yuan Shikai’s proclamation as emperor in 1915 and Zhang Xun’s restoration in 1917 both showed that as long as the office of “emperor” still existed in law, there would always be someone who wanted to occupy it. Only by completely abolishing monarchy could the road to restoration be blocked. Sun Yat-sen’s choice was to use institutional design to guard against the most dangerous part of ambition.
III. The Practical Test of the Republican Proposition: Opposing Yuan Shikai’s Proclamation as Emperor
Sun Yat-sen’s persistence in the republic received its most direct test when Yuan Shikai proclaimed himself emperor. In 1915, when Yuan Shikai was preparing to restore the monarchical system, Sun Yat-sen led the Chinese Revolutionary Party in publicly opposing him, and voiced support for Cai E and others who had launched the National Protection War in Yunnan. For Sun Yat-sen, this was not a personal grudge: Yuan Shikai’s proclamation as emperor meant dragging China back into the dynastic cycle, and that was precisely what he had spent his whole life seeking to break.
His opposition proved that, for him, advocating a republic was a matter of principle, not a slogan that could be discarded after power had been seized. A powerful piece of corroborating evidence is provided by 1912: on condition that the Qing emperor abdicate and that Yuan Shikai approve the republic, Sun Yat-sen resigned from the office of Provisional President. If what he had wanted had been to establish a new dynasty, he would never have handed over supreme power. He handed over power precisely because what he wanted was not “who should be emperor,” but “that there should be no emperor anymore.”
IV. Summary
Sun Yat-sen’s reasons for advocating a republic rather than establishing a new dynasty can therefore be summarised at three levels: first, he diagnosed the root cause of China’s ills as the dynastic system itself, not any one dynasty; second, his Three Principles of the People required that sovereignty reside with the people, which was incompatible with any monarchy; and third, he foresaw that retaining monarchy would inevitably lead to restoration, and history confirmed this point.
For him, a republic was not a “Western fashion,” but the only way out for breaking the cycle of order and disorder of more than two thousand years. Whether this judgment was right or wrong is still being tested by history — but its logic is complete: to end the dynastic cycle, the dynastic system itself must be ended. This is also why, to this day, any discussion of China’s constitutional future must still return to the question Sun Yat-sen raised in 1912: where does power come from, to whom is it accountable, and how is it peacefully handed over?
Further Reading
References
Sun Yat-sen, Inaugural Statement of Min Bao (The People’s Paper) (1905): the Three Principles of the People — the Principle of Nationalism, the Principle of Democracy, and the Principle of the People’s Livelihood (summary of content in this article)
This essay is also published in Simplified Chinese (the master text).
Translated from the ZH-Hans master (published 2026-10-24).