Why Does China Need Genuine Local Self-Government?

In a vast community with marked social differences, if all public decisions are concentrated at the centre, the real needs of localities are often simplified, delayed, or even misread as they are passed up, layer by layer. Local self-government is not breaking unity apart; it is letting those closest to a problem, within the scope laid down by the constitution and the law, hold the power to decide, to implement, and to take responsibility. It expands democracy from periodic voting into everyday governance practice, so that citizens learn negotiation, oversight, and responsibility in the public affairs of schools, communities, and counties and cities. Without this layer, the freedom and participation promised by the constitution easily remain on paper.

1. What Problem Does Local Self-Government Solve?

The greatest cost of a centralised system is not low efficiency, but distorted information and blurred responsibility. The centre finds it hard to grasp the specific conditions of local industry, ecology, education, and social services in each place, yet it must lay down uniform detailed rules for localities that differ greatly from one another, and the result is often a one-size-fits-all approach. Local self-government devolves decision-making power, so that local governments can choose priorities according to local conditions, while accepting the direct scrutiny of local voters. Devolution of power must be accompanied by a list of powers and by fiscal arrangements; otherwise self-government remains in name only, without capability.

2. The Constitutional Position of Self-Government

Genuine local self-government needs a constitutional guarantee, not a favour that the centre can withdraw at any time. The constitution should specify the self-governing matters of localities, their legislative space, and their organisational principles, and it should lay down the statutory conditions and procedures for central intervention. The judiciary should be able to review intervention that exceeds authority, so that local self-government becomes a justiciable structure of rights, rather than a policy slogan. Within this framework, local regulations must not conflict with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution, and the centre’s uniform standards should only guard the floor of rights and the coordination of nationwide public goods.

3. Democracy’s Everyday School

Local elections, council debates, budget disclosure, and hearing procedures are important arenas in which citizens train their democratic capacity. When residents take part in community planning, school budgets, and public health decisions, they can see how their own views become policy, and they can also see how opposing views are answered. This experience cultivates tolerance and compromise better than abstract political slogans. Local self-government also gives different regions space for institutional experimentation: successful experience can be borrowed, and the cost of failure is contained within a local scope.

4. Self-Government Is Neither Secession Nor Laissez-Faire

Some worry that self-government will weaken unity, but self-government constrained by the constitution precisely helps the legitimacy of unity: unity is built on voluntary participation and the protection of rights, not on forced obedience. The other extreme — understanding self-government as localities unconstrained — is equally dangerous. Local power also needs checks and balances, including oversight by the local council, judicial review, disclosure of information, and media oversight. The boundaries of self-government should be expressly delimited by law, and disputes should be decided by independent courts, not unilaterally by the stronger party.

5. From Pilot to Institution: A Gradual but Firm Path

The establishment of local self-government need not be achieved in a single step. The law can first specify the scope of pilots, the criteria for evaluation, and the conditions for wider adoption. Pilot areas should meet basic thresholds in fiscal matters, council oversight, and disclosure of information, and they should regularly publish their results and problems to society. Successful pilots can be adopted more widely by legislation; failed pilots should publicly review the reasons, rather than being covered up or delayed indefinitely. The significance of a gradual path lies in lowering the risk of reform, while accumulating replicable experience. The centre and localities should keep channels of communication open during the pilot period, and disputes should be resolved through negotiation and judicial channels. The final form of the institution should be determined by legislative procedure, not decided automatically by pilot results, so that self-government can have both a practical basis and democratic legitimacy.

6. Where Can Citizens Start?

For ordinary citizens, taking part in local self-government need not wait for grand reform. They can start by understanding the local budget, attending community meetings, and following decisions on schools and public services, and gradually learn to read policy documents, raise questions, and oversee implementation. Civic groups can compile lists of local issues, invite officials to respond publicly, and record how commitments are carried out. These seemingly small actions are precisely the starting point of a culture of self-government: when more and more people grow accustomed to discussing public affairs by rules and evidence, local self-government is no longer merely an institutional design, but the normal state of social life. Institutions and culture shape each other; neither can be missing.

The ultimate test of local self-government is whether residents can feel respected and heard in daily life.

References

  • ROC History & Constitutional Reconstruction — 40 Questions | 中华民国历史与宪政重建四十问
  • Introduction to this series (six pieces; see the series index)
  • Democratic Transition on the Mainland and the Restoration of ROC Constitutional Government — Expansion of the Free Area, National Elections, and the Dual ROC Constitutional Crisis
  • The ROC (Taiwan) and Its Participation in Mainland Democratic Transition: Parties, Legislation, and Public Opinion Scenario Studies
  • The ROC Constitutional and Legal Reform Roadmap Before, During, and After Mainland Democratic Transition — Current Legal Obstacles, Legislative Authority, and a Phased Implementation Plan
  • Seven-Law Transition Package (a proposed model law compilation, not laws already in force)

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Translated from the ZH-Hans master (published 2026-11-02).