Is Federalism Suitable for a Future China?

In discussing federalism, one must first distinguish the name from the substance. Federalism usually means that a constitution divides sovereignty between the centre and the constituent units, that the constituent units possess constitutionally guaranteed autonomy which the centre may not unilaterally withdraw. Its appeal lies in accommodating diversity through institutions and in checking concentrated power through the division of power; its risk lies in rising coordination costs, local protectionism, and uneven standards of rights. Whether it is suitable cannot be judged from the label alone. It depends on how much diversity the future polity must handle, how strong a unity it seeks, and whether a fair dispute-resolution mechanism can be established.

1. What Federalism Can Offer

The core promise of federalism is dual democracy: citizens are members both of the national polity and of a local polity, and both levels of government are directly accountable to citizens. Such a structure helps protect local culture, language, and ways of life, brings policy closer to local realities, and provides more entry points for political participation. Where territory is vast and regional development is uneven, the division of power helps prevent a single centre from suppressing diversity in the name of unity, and leaves room for institutional experimentation. Successful local experience can be shared within a federal framework without waiting for uniform promotion by the centre.

2. What Federalism May Cost

The division of power is not costless. Overlapping legislative jurisdiction can trigger disputes over competence; differences in tax and welfare standards may lead residents to migrate in search of better services; and local governments may erect barriers in the name of protecting local interests. Historically, where a federation has lacked a common market, a common floor of rights, and effective central coordination, the unified market and the equality of citizens have easily been damaged. Moreover, the division of constituent units is itself a political problem: whether units are drawn by historical territory, by population size, or by functional need, the choice will affect the future balance of power and requires open and careful discussion.

3. Options Between Federalism and a Unitary System

Many systems sit between federalism and a unitary system — for example, a unitary system in which local autonomy is constitutionally guaranteed, or highly devolved regional autonomy. The key question is not the name, but three tests: whether local autonomy is guaranteed by the constitution rather than granted administratively; whether disputes between the centre and localities are decided by an independent judiciary; and whether basic rights have a uniform floor nationwide. If these three tests are met, strong local autonomy under a unitary system can also achieve many of federalism’s advantages; if they are missing, then even a system called federal may still leave localities subject to the centre. Discussion should therefore focus on the guarantee mechanisms, not merely argue over the name.

4. Conditions for Judging Suitability

To judge whether federalism is suitable, at least four questions must be asked: whether society has a broad consensus on the division of power, or whether it is only the demand of some regions; whether the boundaries of the constituent units and their representation mechanisms can be broadly accepted; whether fiscal and judicial arrangements can support both levels of government operating effectively at the same time; and whether rights-protection mechanisms can prevent a local majority from infringing on minorities. If these conditions are not yet mature, hastily reorganising in the name of federalism may create new conflicts; if conditions gradually come into place, a design for the division of power deserves serious drafting and open debate. Any proposal should first go through open discussion and lawful procedure, rather than being decided by a small number of people.

5. Open Debate and Lawful Procedure Are Prerequisites

Whatever the final choice — federalism or a unitary system with strong local autonomy — the decision-making process itself must be open and lawful. Proposals should be published in the form of a white paper or draft, setting out the specific design for the division of power, fiscal arrangements, judicial mechanisms, and rights protection, and leaving sufficient time for public consultation. The views of different regions and different groups should be recorded and responded to, and major divisions should not be forced through by a simple majority. Final adoption of a proposal must go through a lawful constitution-making or constitutional-amendment procedure and be subject to judicial review. The fairness of the procedure determines the acceptability of the outcome: a federal proposal that has not been fully debated, however attractive its name, will struggle to win lasting support.

6. Learning from Institutional Comparison, Not Copying

In discussing federalism, comparing other countries’ experience is helpful, but copying a particular model often backfires. Each country’s federal structure grows out of its own history, ethnic composition, and territorial conditions, and its success factors may not apply to another society. The correct method of comparison is to extract principles rather than replicate provisions: how power is divided, how disputes are resolved, how rights are protected, and how finances are coordinated. These principles need to be redesigned in the local context. Open comparative research should explain the conditions under which each model applies and the lessons of its failures, helping the public to judge on the basis of full information, rather than substituting a foreign label for local debate.

References

  • ROC History & Constitutional Reconstruction — 40 Questions | 中华民国历史与宪政重建四十问
  • Introduction to this series (six parts; see the series index)
  • Mainland Democratic Transition and the Restoration of the Republic of China Constitution — Free-Area Expansion, Nationwide Elections, and the Dual ROC Constitutional Crisis
  • The Republic of China (Taiwan) and Mainland Democratic Transition: Parties, Legislature, and Public Opinion
  • From Late-Qing Consultative Bureaus to Republican Provincial Assemblies: Provincial Representative Institutions, Electoral Representativeness, and the Provincial Constitution Movement in China, 1909–1925
  • From Exile Consultation to Democratic Constitution-Making: Representativeness, Limits of Authorization, and Lawful Approval Procedures for Pre-Transition Provincial Constitutional Preparatory Bodies on the Mainland
  • Seven-Law Transition Package (a proposed model-law compilation, not laws already in force)

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Translated from the ZH-Hans master (published 2026-11-02).