How fiscal powers are divided determines whether local self-government can actually take hold. If localities have functional responsibilities but no fiscal powers, self-government becomes cooking without rice; if the central government loses the coordination capacity it needs, nationwide guarantees and coordination will also come to nothing. A reasonable division is not a one-off proportional split, but a set of rules: who levies taxes, who spends, who is responsible, and who supervises should all be written clearly into law, and be adjustable as the economic structure changes. The fairness of fiscal arrangements is ultimately shown in whether citizens can obtain basic and decent public services where they live.
1. First Divide Functional Responsibilities, Then Talk About Fiscal Powers
The precondition for fiscal division is clear functional responsibilities. Matters close to residents — education, primary health care, social assistance, local roads, and environmental governance — should be led mainly by local governments; national defense, foreign affairs, nationwide infrastructure, and cross-regional coordination should be led mainly by the center. When responsibilities are unclear, negotiations over fiscal powers will inevitably be chaotic, and higher levels can easily push expenditure responsibilities downward while retaining revenue powers. The law should define each level’s duties by an itemized list, and provide that any newly added responsibility must be accompanied by corresponding funding, so as to avoid unfunded mandates.
2. Revenue Division Must Be Stable and Predictable
Localities need stable, predictable own revenues before they can draw up multi-year budgets and answer to voters. Tax bases suited to local government are usually those strongly linked to the local economy and property and with low mobility; highly mobile items whose tax base can easily shift should go to the center, to prevent destructive competition among localities. Revenue division should be written into law; adjustments must go through the legislative process and include a transition period, and must not be changed at will by administrative order. Localities should also have limited room, within statutory limits, to set tax rates or charges, so that fiscal choices are connected to local preferences.
3. Transfer Payments Close Gaps, Do Not Breed Dependence
Fiscal capacity gaps between regions objectively exist; the role of central transfer payments is to guarantee equalization of basic services, not to erase every difference. Transfer payments should be based on a published formula, taking account of population, income levels, service costs, and special needs, with calculation results published regularly and subject to audit and public oversight. Special-purpose grants should be limited in purpose and duration, so they do not become tools for central intervention in local detail. General-purpose grants should respect local priorities. No grant should be conditional on political loyalty; otherwise finance will become a means of control.
4. Budget Openness and Accountability
Fiscal powers must be tied to accountability mechanisms. Budgets, final accounts, debts, and major procurements at all levels should be disclosed to the public; local councils should have substantive powers of deliberation; audit bodies should exercise their functions independently. Local debt must have caps and disclosure rules, to prevent mortgaging future revenues for present political achievements. Only when citizens and the media can inspect accounts and raise questions does fiscal discipline have a social basis. Fiscal disputes between the center and localities should be decided through legal procedures and independent institutions, not resolved by administrative pressure.
5. Oversight, Evaluation, and Periodic Adjustment
Fiscal division rules need periodic review, not permanence. Economic structure, population distribution, and service costs all change; if revenue division and transfer formulas are not adjusted for a long time, fairness will gradually drain away. The law should provide for a public evaluation of the fiscal system every few years; evaluation reports should cover changes in revenues and expenditures, debt, service levels, and regional gaps at all levels, and should hear the views of local councils and the public. The adjustment process should be transparent; major changes must go through the legislative process and include transitional arrangements, to avoid suddenly unbalancing local budgets. Audit and openness are the basis of evaluation; without reliable data, no adjustment can command acceptance.
6. How Citizens Can Read the Fiscal Accounts
No matter how well designed fiscal rules are, if citizens cannot understand the accounts, oversight will still be hard to put into practice. Local governments should publish budget summaries in plain language, explaining main revenue sources, spending priorities, and debt position, and provide searchable detail. Civic groups and the media can help interpret data, compare service levels and fiscal efficiency across regions, and propose improvements. School and community education can also include basic fiscal knowledge, so residents understand the relationship between taxation and services. Reading the accounts is not a professional privilege, but a basic capacity for democratic participation, and a social line of defense against fiscal abuse.
Combined with fiscal transparency and citizen participation, local finance can truly serve residents’ welfare rather than the interests of a few.
Putting this set of rules into practice requires long-term cooperation among legislation, audit, and citizen oversight.
References
- ROC History & Constitutional Reconstruction — 40 Questions
- Introduction to this series (six pieces, see series index)
- Democratic Transition on the Mainland and the Restoration of the Republic of China Constitution — Expansion of the Free Area, Nationwide Elections, and the Dual ROC Constitutional Crisis
- The ROC Constitutional and Legal Reform Roadmap Before, During, and After Mainland Democratic Transition — Obstacles in Current Law, Legislative Competence, and Phased Implementation Plans
- The Unfinished Constitutional Road: Guo Songtao, Song Jiaoren, and Chen Jiongming on State-Building Thought and the Historical Boundaries of Chinese Federalism
- From Provincial Constitution Promises to Streamlining Reform: The Institutional Reduction of Taiwan’s Provincial Government and the Transfer of Fiscal Responsibility (1948–present)
- Seven-Law Transition Package (proposed model law compilation, not laws already in force)
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Translated from the ZH-Hans master (published 2026-11-02).
