Why Was Yuan Shikai Able to Undermine the Republican System of the Early Republic?

The Republic of China was founded in 1912, but by the time Yuan Shikai died in 1916, the republican system of the early Republic already existed in name only: political parties had been dissolved, the National Assembly had been dissolved, the constitution that limited power had been abolished, and Yuan Shikai himself had even proclaimed himself emperor for a time. Why was a newly founded republic so fragile? The answer does not lie in fatalistic theories such as “national character” — the later democratization of ROC (Taiwan) has already falsified that kind of argument (see Section Eight of the published Q1 paper). The answer lies in the specific structure of power: Yuan Shikai held the most organized military force in China at the time, and used it to dismantle, systematically, every pillar of the republican system.

First, consider the balance of power. In 1912, the revolutionaries possessed moral appeal and the support of the southern provinces, but the country’s finest military force — the Beiyang New Army — was in Yuan Shikai’s hands. In the final years of the Qing dynasty, Yuan Shikai had trained a new army at Xiaozhan, Tianjin, and built China’s first modernized land force. The officers of this army were selected and trained by him personally, and the object of their loyalty was Yuan Shikai as an individual, not any constitution or parliament. Sun Yat-sen’s resignation as Provisional President, on condition that the Qing emperor abdicate and that Yuan Shikai endorse the republic, was a political bargain: the revolutionaries obtained the name of “republic,” and Yuan Shikai obtained the real power to command the country’s strongest army. This bargain was unequal from the start.

I. Military Power: An Army That Did Not Obey the Constitution

The premise of a republican system is that the army obeys the constitution and the elected government, rather than obeying any one person. But the Beiyang Army was precisely the opposite: its command system, its sources of pay, and its personnel appointments were all tied to Yuan Shikai alone. Whenever Yuan Shikai came into conflict with the National Assembly, he held in his hand a card the revolutionaries did not have — an army that could be mobilized. During the “Second Revolution” of 1913, the Beiyang Army swiftly suppressed the anti-Yuan armed forces in the southern provinces; this is proof of that point.

If, in a republic, its army’s loyalty belongs to one person rather than to the constitution, then the constitution is only a scrap of paper. On this point, the published Q1 paper provides a systematic mechanism analysis (on the object of loyalty of the army and the security organs, see Section Nine, “Explanation A,” of that paper): the object of the army’s loyalty determines whether the provisions of a constitution can be put into practice. Its conclusions are cited here, and its argument is not repeated.

II. Removing the Parliamentary Leader: The Assassination of Song Jiaoren

From late 1912 to early 1913, China held its first National Assembly elections, and the Kuomintang, led by Song Jiaoren, won the largest bloc of seats. Song Jiaoren advocated parliamentary politics: a cabinet formed by the majority party in the National Assembly, with party politics used to constrain presidential power. This was a direct threat to Yuan Shikai — if Song Jiaoren succeeded in forming a cabinet, the president would be shut inside the cage of the constitution.

In March 1913, Song Jiaoren was assassinated at Shanghai railway station. Historical research still differs on who masterminded the assassination, and no conclusion is drawn here; but the objective effect of the assassination is clear: parliamentary politics lost its most capable organizer, the Kuomintang was left leaderless, and Yuan Shikai lost a most dangerous opponent. Violence proved once again that it could bypass the ballot to solve problems. For Song Jiaoren’s constitutional thought, see the published study The Unfinished Constitutional Road.

III. Dissolving Parties and the National Assembly: Dismantling the Pillars of the System

After Song Jiaoren’s death, Yuan Shikai’s actions became more and more open. In 1913, he ordered the Kuomintang dissolved and expelled Kuomintang members from the National Assembly; in January 1914, he dissolved the National Assembly; thereafter, he abolished the Provisional Constitution and promulgated the Constitutional Compact of the Republic of China, which expanded presidential power. In little more than a year, the three pillars of the republican system — competitive political parties, an elected parliament, and a constitution that limited power — were dismantled one by one.

No step met with effective resistance, because the organizational resources that resistance required — the army and finance — were both in Yuan Shikai’s hands. The National Assembly could issue declarations, and the newspapers could attack, but without coercive force to support them, legal texts could not stop a president who held the army in his hands. This was the most fatal weakness of the early Republic: the institutional design was complete, but the power to enforce the system was not in the system’s hands.

IV. Proclaiming Himself Emperor under the Hongxian Reign: From Undermining to Restoration

After dismantling the republican system, Yuan Shikai took the final step. In December 1915, he announced that he accepted the imperial throne, gave his reign the title “Hongxian,” and prepared to ascend the throne formally on New Year’s Day 1916. This was not a momentary impulse, but the logical end point of the preceding steps: since parliament, political parties, and the constitutional compact could all be abolished, why not restore the emperor directly?

But in this step he went too far. Cai E and others launched the National Protection War in Yunnan, province after province declared independence, and the wave of opposition far exceeded Yuan Shikai’s expectations. In March 1916, Yuan Shikai was forced to abolish the monarchical system; in June of the same year, he died deserted by his followers. The restoration lasted only a little more than eighty days, but the damage it caused was long-lasting: the authority of the central government collapsed completely, and China entered the era of warlord fragmentation. The imperial system did not return, and the republic was not preserved either — this was the worst outcome.

V. Why Could He Succeed: The Three Things the Newborn Republic Lacked

Yuan Shikai was able to succeed not because he as an individual was especially powerful, but because the republican system of 1912 lacked three key supports: first, the nationalization of the army had not been achieved — the strongest army was loyal to an individual; second, fiscal and administrative resources were concentrated in the hands of the old bureaucracy and military groups, and the National Assembly had no independent capacity for enforcement; and third, there was no coercive mechanism to protect political competition — when Yuan Shikai used violence, there was no independent judicial or police force that could stop him.

These three gaps are precisely what every later constitutional effort must fill. To understand how Yuan Shikai succeeded is to understand what kind of foundation a republican system needs. The enemy of a republic is never some specific “bad person,” but the institutional gaps that allow a bad person to do as he pleases. To close these gaps — the army obeying the constitution, finance subject to parliamentary supervision, and violence subject to an independent sanction mechanism — is the true lesson that 1916 left to those who came after.

Further Reading

Index of the Forty Questions

From the 1911 Revolution to Today: Why Does China Repeatedly Fall into the Political Cycle of Dynastic Change? — A Mechanism Analysis of 1911–1916 (Military Loyalty, Political Violence); this question cites its conclusions

The Unfinished Constitutional Road: Guo Songtao, Song Jiaoren, and Chen Jiongming on State-Building and the Historical Boundaries of Chinese Federalism — Song Jiaoren’s constitutional thought; this question cites it

Scale of War and Dynastic Collapse: A Comparative Study of Political Alliances, State Capacity, and Institutional Transition in the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and the 1911 Revolution (1851–1912) | Complete Research Manuscript V2.0

References

Constitutional Compact of the Republic of China (1914): the text of the compact that expanded presidential power (cited in this article for institutional facts)

From the 1911 Revolution to Today: Why Does China Repeatedly Fall into the Political Cycle of Dynastic Change? — A Mechanism Analysis of 1911–1916; this question cites its conclusions, and its argument is not repeated

The Unfinished Constitutional Road: Guo Songtao, Song Jiaoren, and Chen Jiongming on State-Building and the Historical Boundaries of Chinese Federalism — background on Song Jiaoren’s constitutional thought

This essay is also published in Simplified Chinese (the master text).

Translated from the ZH-Hans master (published 2026-10-24).