ROC(Taiwan) is rapidly expanding drone production, procurement and non-PRC(Mainland) supply chains as part of an asymmetric-defense strategy. Recent figures show substantial industrial growth, while new procurement plans would add tens of thousands of attack and reconnaissance drones. The strategic question is whether production, components, software and repair capacity can survive disruption.
ROC(Taiwan)’s asymmetric-defense strategy is moving from doctrine toward industrial scale. The clearest evidence is in drones: domestic output and exports have risen sharply, military procurement is expanding, and policy is increasingly focused on removing PRC(Mainland) components from sensitive supply chains.
The numbers require careful separation. DSET reports that ROC(Taiwan) exported 122,706 drones in 2025, up sharply from 2024. A March 2026 Taiwan News report put 2025 production above 120,000 units. DSET reports the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ longer-term target is production capacity of 100,000 drones per month by 2030, backed by the Integrated Program for Uncrewed Vehicle Industry Development and a six-year funding framework for uncrewed systems.
Military demand is becoming more concrete. On September 3, CNA reported that the Cabinet’s supplementary-budget proposal included NT$55.9 billion for more than 40,000 coastal attack drones, 600 coastal reconnaissance drones and 100 small one-way unmanned surface vessels for 2027. Those are proposed procurements, not proof that every unit has been contracted or delivered.
The industrial strategy is linked to supply-chain security. Public reporting says ROC(Taiwan) aims to eliminate PRC(Mainland)-made components from sensitive drone supply chains. An asymmetric arsenal is only as resilient as its motors, communications links, sensors, navigation, software, batteries and replacement parts. A large peacetime inventory that depends on vulnerable external inputs could degrade quickly in a blockade or conflict.
International partnerships are part of the answer. In June 2025, the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology signed a partnership with Auterion for combat-tested drone software. In June 2026, the government-sponsored Metal Industries Research & Development Centre signed an MOU with Anduril on UAV development. In September 2026, CSBC announced licensed co-production work with U.S. autonomy firm Havoc on autonomous surface vessels. These agreements do not by themselves prove wartime capacity, but they broaden the technology and production base.
The strategic logic is asymmetric: use larger numbers of relatively inexpensive, mobile and replaceable systems to complicate an adversary’s ability to mass forces, cross the strait, establish lodgments and sustain operations. But scale alone can become a misleading metric. Ukraine’s experience has also shown rapid adaptation, electronic warfare, software iteration and high attrition. Deterrence therefore depends on whether ROC(Taiwan) can replenish systems, update them and keep command links functioning under attack.
Production protection should be treated as part of deterrence itself. Dispersed factories, redundant suppliers, protected inventories, repair depots, alternative communications and pre-qualified component substitutions matter alongside procurement totals. Export markets can help maintain industrial scale in peacetime, but overseas demand should not be confused with guaranteed surge capacity during a crisis.
FCM assessment
A credible asymmetric strategy should be measured by sustainable combat capacity rather than headline inventory. Public reporting should distinguish annual production, exports, military orders, contracted deliveries and surge capacity. ROC(Taiwan) should also publish non-sensitive resilience indicators such as the share of critical components sourced outside PRC(Mainland), number of qualified suppliers, repair throughput and ability to restart production after disruption.
Established: DSET records 122,706 drone exports in 2025; government plans call for major additional uncrewed-system procurement; ROC(Taiwan) is pursuing non-PRC(Mainland) supply chains and international technology/co-production partnerships.
Not established: Export volume is not military inventory or wartime capacity; proposed procurement is not delivered equipment; public sources reviewed do not prove current factories could operate at full scale under blockade; “millions of drones” is an analytical judgment, not an official procurement requirement established here.
Sources
- DSET: Japan Is Back — the emerging Taiwan–Japan non-red drone supply-chain partnership
- Focus Taiwan: Cabinet proposes supplementary budget
- Focus Taiwan: MIRDC–Anduril drone-development MOU
- Focus Taiwan: CSBC–Havoc autonomous-surface-vessel partnership
- Reuters: NCSIST–Auterion drone-software partnership
- Taiwan News: 2025 drone-production growth