After a regime completes a democratic transition, how should it confront the harm of the past? Who should bear responsibility for persecution in the authoritarian period? How can victims obtain compensation? How is historical truth to be established, and by whom is it to be written? Taken together, these questions are “transitional justice.” The Republic of China (Taiwan) has made decades of attempts in this area: there is experience worth recording, and there are also clear limitations. Understanding both sides is equally important for thinking about the mainland in the future — because transitional justice is not an “extra question” added after a transition is complete, but part of the transition itself.
I. What Has Been Done: Four Main Lines
Transitional justice in the ROC (Taiwan) has unfolded broadly along four main lines. The first is reparation and compensation: in the 1990s, the government successively enacted the Act Governing the Handling of and Compensation for the February 28 Incident (1995) and the Compensation Act for Improper Trials of Rebellion and Espionage Cases during the Martial Law Period (1998), so that victims of the February 28 Incident and of the White Terror period, and their families, received a formal apology from the state and monetary compensation. The second is the opening of archives and the investigation of the truth: the Transitional Justice Commission, established in 2018, was responsible for investigating the truth about the period of authoritarian rule, redressing judicial wrongs, and opening political archives; it was dissolved in 2022 after presenting its final report. The third is the recovery of ill-gotten party assets: the Ill-gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee, established in 2016, is responsible for recovering improper assets acquired by political parties during the authoritarian period, cutting off the material foundation of “the party leading the state.” The fourth is commemoration and education: establishing the National Human Rights Museum, erecting memorial monuments, and revising history textbooks, so that the next generation knows what happened.
These four main lines show that transitional justice is not a single matter, but a set of tasks: reparation addresses the question of “people,” archives address the question of “truth,” party assets address the question of “power structures,” and commemoration addresses the question of “memory.”
II. Experience: Which Practices Are Worth Drawing On
Among the experience of the ROC (Taiwan), several points have general reference value. The first is to handle “reparation” and “the truth” separately: reparation can be started relatively quickly — victims are already advanced in age and cannot wait through a lengthy investigation; investigation of the truth, by contrast, requires more time, and accuracy must not be sacrificed for speed. First give victims an accounting, then slowly set out the history clearly — this ordering is pragmatic.
The second is that the opening of archives is the foundation. Without archives, there is no basis on which to speak of the truth; if archives are destroyed or remain sealed, any investigative commission can only remain at the surface. The process of opening political archives in the ROC (Taiwan) has gone through twists and turns, but its direction is clear: the governing archives of the authoritarian period belong to public property; they do not belong to the private property of any political party or individual.
Third, reparation is not equal to reconciliation, but it is a precondition for reconciliation. Monetary compensation cannot erase harm, but it conveys a signal: the state acknowledges that it was wrong in the past. Without that acknowledgment, so-called “looking forward” is only a demand that victims keep silent.
III. Limitations: Where What Was Done Fell Short
Transitional justice in the ROC (Taiwan) also has clear limitations. The greatest limitation is the lack of criminal prosecution: most perpetrators from the authoritarian period have already died, or cannot be prosecuted because of legal limitation periods. Transitional justice in the ROC (Taiwan) has relied mainly on administrative means and reparation mechanisms, rather than on criminal trials — “perpetrators” have rarely truly stood in a courtroom. This means that justice has to a large extent been symbolic, rather than punitive.
The second is that the task was not completed, yet the institution was dissolved first. When the Transitional Justice Commission was dissolved in 2022, a number of tasks were transferred to various ministries and commissions to continue handling, but the strength and visibility of subsequent implementation both clearly declined. The truth report put forward recommendations, but the recommendations lacked compulsory enforcement power, and implementation has been uneven.
The third is the controversy over politicization. The blue and green camps have long been divided in their assessment of transitional justice, so that it has often been questioned as a political tool of the ruling party. Once transitional justice is labelled as partisan, its moral authority is discounted, and social consensus also becomes harder to form. This is a profound lesson: if transitional justice cannot rise above political parties, it will be very difficult for it to fulfil its most important mission — enabling the whole of society to confront the past together.
IV. Implications for the Future
The experience of the ROC (Taiwan) leaves several implications for the future. First, the preservation of archives must be done early. Archives from around the time of a change of regime are the most liable to be lost — some people destroy them, some people keep them privately. Once archives disappear, the truth will forever be missing a piece. Civil and overseas forces can act in advance in this area; there is no need to wait until a transition occurs.
Second, reparation mechanisms must be connected with the judiciary. How the rehabilitation of political prisoners, reparation, and judicial independence are to be connected is a specialized question of institutional design (another article in this series discusses it separately). The experience of the ROC (Taiwan) shows that reparation legislation can go first, but in the end matters must return to the track of the rule of law.
Third, and most importantly: the purpose of transitional justice is to rebuild the rule of law, not to replace one group of people with another in carrying out revenge. Replacing the rule of law with collective revenge will only create new injustice. The ROC (Taiwan) did not carry out a large-scale purge of personnel of the old regime; this is both a limitation and a form of restraint — the value of restraint lies in that it proves the difference between the new system and the old system.
Finally, remember the reminder in the introduction: the experience of the ROC (Taiwan) is a reference for “what has been done,” not a template that must be copied exactly. The scale of the mainland, the number of victims, and the condition of the archives all differ from those of the ROC (Taiwan), and specific reparation standards, investigative mechanisms, and timetables must be designed anew. But the direction is clear: only by confronting the past can one move toward the future; evade the past, and the past will return.
Further Reading
References
ROC40-I04 introductory concept — Experience cannot be treated as an operations manual that can be copied directly; this question cites it.
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Translated from the ZH-Hans master (published 2026-10-24).
Other language editions of this question: Simplified Chinese edition is published.