Research Paper v1.0 | October 19, 2026
Review record: independent Editorial review, October 19, 2026. Verdict: PASS (source gradings and open items are disclosed in the text).
Abstract
This article examines provincial and county self-government from the local-government regulations of 1909 to the Constitution of the Republic of China of 1947. Rather than equating the presence of constitutional language with actual autonomy, it separates legal competence, fiscal control, executive selection, administrative supervision, and remedies. Zhejiang's provincial constitution of 1921 enumerated county powers over roads and revenue while retaining gubernatorial appointment of county magistrates. The 1931 Tutelage Provisional Constitution and the unadopted May Fifth Draft of 1936 combined the vocabulary of county self-government with hierarchical administrative command. Zhejiang's county-budget rules, road-building disciplinary regulations, and statistical records from the 1930s provide an empirical test of the distance between legal design and administrative execution. The Federal Highway Act of 1921 serves as a deliberately non-equivalent American comparison: the source of funds, control of projects, approval, reimbursement, and maintenance are analytically distinct. The printed county-road figures, now verified by independent re-transcription, are excluded from claims about actual treasury disbursement or institutional success. The central finding is that effective local self-government depends not simply on enumerated powers but on an accountable alignment of revenue, budget authorization, executive responsibility, and auditable implementation. The available sources do not establish direct textual transmission from Zhejiang’s 1921 provincial constitution to the 1947 national constitution; evidence grades distinguish inspected legal originals from later transcriptions and provisional administrative tabulations.
I. Research Question and Method
Local self-government was not a single institutional variable. A county might have legal responsibility for roads without authority to approve a new public-works budget. Its council might be elected while its magistrate remained appointed by the governor. Money raised locally could be controlled, spent, or audited elsewhere. The labels “federal” and “unitary” therefore cannot substitute for analysis of five distinct questions: the legal rank of local competences, allocation of residual powers and disputes, selection and removal of executives, control over revenue and debt, and enforceable supervision or remedies.
Four kinds of sources establish different propositions. Constitutional texts and statutes establish legal design; administrative orders and minutes document decisions and approval procedures; statistical returns establish reported aggregates within stated coverage; and payment vouchers, final accounts, election records, and adjudications are needed to establish implementation. Original facsimiles and official legal texts already inspected are distinguished from historical transcriptions and provisional statistical collation. Coverage is insufficient for 1898–1908, 1913–1919, and 1937–1945; the paper therefore uses the verifiably comparable 1909–1947 span rather than claiming to be a continuous general history of Chinese federalism.[1][2]
II. Local Public Works and the Provincial Constitutional Moment
The 1909 regulations assigned roads, bridges, and drainage to local public-benefit affairs while preserving official supervision over contributions, budgets, final accounts, and local organs. They created neither sovereign constituent states nor proof of uniform implementation. The 1912 Provisional Constitution supplied a separate national framework of popular sovereignty, regional representation, and national fiscal decisions. The 1921 Zhejiang provincial constitution, 1922 Hunan provincial constitution, and a 1923 Sichuan draft (not independently collated against its original here) raised different questions about provincial legal personality, political representation, and membership in a common republic. Contemporary Hunan Assembly statements described provincial autonomy as a possible route to national reconstruction, not necessarily secession. Sun Yat-sen's 1924 Outline for National Reconstruction offered a county-centered path to local autonomy and functional division of powers. Similar language among these designs is not evidence of direct textual borrowing without drafting records.[1][2][3][4]
The 1912 Jiangxi provisional charter offers another model for the relationship between provisional provincial authority and a future national republican constitution. The surviving historical electronic transcription, dated 24 January 1912, states in Article 3 that the provincial charter would cease when a national republican constitution entered into force. Article 4 envisages a popularly elected military governor serving a three-year term, renewable only once; Article 8 permits emergency law-substituting orders issued after consultation with executive commissioners, subject to subsequent legislative ratification. The transcribed Ezhou charter's Article 3 likewise anticipates national constitutional supremacy but conditionally allows a separately recognized local constitution. The two texts thus propose different arrangements for terminating provisional authority and preserving local constitutional space. The checked electronic versions remain B-TEXT historical transcriptions: contemporary 1911–1912 printed originals and evidence of implementation have not been inspected. The text does not establish that elections or legislative ratification occurred, nor does it prove direct Jiangxi borrowing from Ezhou.[16]
The legal effect of provisional provincial charters requires separate tests of timing and institutional authority. In the historical transcription of the 1912 Jiangxi charter, Article 3 makes the coming into force of a national republican constitution a condition for the provincial charter to lapse, while Article 8 requires later legislative ratification of emergency orders issued by the military governor. Article 3 of the transcribed Ezhou charter instead provides for the provisional charter to lapse upon the full establishment of the ROC, while conditionally envisaging a separately recognized local constitution. Its Article 60 includes bracketed editorial wording around the date-of-promulgation formula; the transcription alone does not establish the original promulgated wording or an effective date. Lapse, ex post ratification, and national recognition address different legal problems; together they do not establish independent provincial constituent sovereignty. The competence lists of Zhejiang’s 1921 provincial constitution and the center–province–county allocations of the 1947 ROC Constitution provide later comparators, not evidence of direct inheritance from those 1911–1912 texts. The original promulgated charters, ratification records, and implementing orders remain unverified.[5][13][16]
III. Zhejiang's 1921 Constitution
Article 126 of the Zhejiang provincial constitution distinguished provincial trunk roads from local branches, while Articles 135–139 addressed county roads, taxes, limited-purpose borrowing, and publication of county budgets and accounts. Article 101 capped the national-expense contribution at 30 percent of provincial revenue. Articles 110, 119, and 124 prescribed minimum budget shares of 20 percent for education, 7 percent for industry, and 5 percent for transportation, respectively, measured against provincial budgeted expenditure. The national-expense ceiling and spending floors have different denominators; none establishes actual disbursement. Articles 90–91 provided for audit oversight of provincial treasury payments, not proof of county-treasury payment. Under Article 128, the governor appointed county magistrates; Article 130 provided for direct election of county councillors; and Article 131 routed impeachment initiated by the council through the governor. This was a mixed architecture of popular representation and provincial executive control, not fully realized county democracy.[5]
Articles 103, 107, and 109 of the Zhejiang constitution required provincial budget approval, final accounts, and public disclosure. Articles 90–91 governed audit endorsement before provincial treasury payment. These procedures do not establish county payments.[5]
The evidentiary chain must be tested at five distinct levels: (1) legally assigned governmental competence; (2) preparation and approval of provincial or county budgets; (3) administrative authorization, supervision, and acceptance of a specific road project; (4) documented collection, transfer, and actual payment; and (5) final accounts, audit, and enforceable accountability. Zhejiang Constitution Articles 103, 107, and 109 concerned provincial budgets, final accounts, and disclosure, while Articles 90–91 addressed audit controls on provincial-treasury payment. None substitutes for county cashbooks, county-assembly decisions, bank records, or construction settlements. A county's appearance in the 1933 road-construction statistics does not establish an equal disbursement from its own treasury. The unreconciled eighteen-county provisional transcription and the withdrawn misclassification of Yiwu road length as expenditure are excluded from claims about payments or performance.[5][8][9][11]
An apparent tension between the province-wide revenue language of article 99 and the county levies protected by article 136 must be read alongside Article 12 of the Implementation Act, which continued existing tax rates and collection methods pending lawful revision. Legal authority, enacted tax schedules, actual receipts, and payment routes did not change automatically on promulgation. Articles 16–18 of the Implementation Act on interim military finance, garrison command and disarmament planning likewise establish legal possibilities rather than the actual obedience of stationed troops.[5]
IV. The Constitutional Reconfigurations of 1923, 1931, and 1936
Article 128 of the 1923 national constitution linked local democratic authorization with distinct fiscal protections. Clause 2 prescribed direct popular election of county magistrates, but suspended its application until judicial independence and lower-level self-government had been established. Clause 3 permitted retention of part of the provincial taxes borne by the county, capped at four-tenths rather than guaranteed at that rate. Clause 4 protected county property and self-government funds against provincial disposal, while clause 5 provided a route to provincial subsidies in disasters or fiscal shortfalls requiring deliberation and resolution by the provincial executive council and provincial assembly, with payment from the provincial treasury. Article 128(6) also required counties to comply with national and provincial laws. Article 129 left the classification of provincial and county taxes to provincial assembly decisions. Conditional elections, protected assets, retention ceilings, subsidy approval, and actual payments are therefore separate legal and empirical questions. The 1921 Zhejiang model of gubernatorial appointment, the 1923 conditional election model, the 1936 draft’s central eligibility screening and transitional appointment, and the 1947 Constitution’s popular election provision cannot be conflated or treated as evidence of actual elections. The 1923 constitutional provisions on provincial forces and national defense also caution against treating provincial autonomy as independent military sovereignty; neither a legal allocation nor a declaration establishes effective command over troops.[5][6][8][13]
Articles 59–64 of the 1931 Tutelage Provisional Constitution adopted functional equalization and statutory restrictions on local taxation, while Articles 78, 81, and 82 retained central direction of provinces, provincial direction of counties, and county-autonomy preparatory institutions. Articles 98–99 of the unadopted 1936 May Fifth Draft placed provincial governors under central appointment while Articles 103–109 retained a conditional county-self-government design. Its articles 108–109 subjected magistrate eligibility to central qualification and delegated county duties to provincial direction; article 144 prescribed central appointment where county autonomy remained incomplete. The draft cannot be treated as enacted law, and its retention of county institutions cannot be equated with operational self-government.[6][7][8]
The fiscal genealogy is equally revealing. Article 61 of the 1931 instrument reserved central–local tax allocation to legislation, while article 62 required legal restrictions against six specified abuses, including discriminatory taxation of incoming goods and local transit levies. Articles 129–130 of the 1936 draft required legally competent deliberation on compulsory revenues and expressly barred domestic transit duties, alongside a guarantee of free movement of goods. Article 148 of the 1947 Constitution retained the free-circulation guarantee but did not reproduce the draft’s express transit-tax ban verbatim. These are distinct normative choices, not proof of textual borrowing or actual local tax practice.[7][8][13]
V. Zhejiang County Administration and Fiscal Evidence
The 1933 Zhejiang county records first establish administrative procedures, not road-building outcomes. The provisional county-budget rules counted local receipts and provincial subventions among budget resources, directed officials to use the previous three years' actual receipts as a reference, and subjected funding for new county undertakings to prior approval by the provincial finance department together with the competent department. Drawing on contingency reserves likewise required provincial authorization. County responsibility for proposing and carrying out a public undertaking therefore did not imply final authority over its budget. The contemporary magistrates' road-building disciplinary rules tied executive evaluation to fundraising, timely construction, labor requisition (徵工), and interruptions of work, with provincial construction, civil-affairs, and government organs involved in the decision. Provincial budget control and personnel discipline could thus coexist with county-level financing and execution burdens. A May 1933 provincial decision concerning reorganization of Deqing County's fiscal office proves an approval decision, not that reorganization occurred. These sources identify a testable sequence—county proposal, provincial approval, county execution, and provincial assessment—but do not establish province-wide compliance, disbursement, or completion rates.[9]
The Provisional Rules for Preparing Zhejiang County Local Budgets, promulgated on 12 May 1933, also imposed controls after budget preparation. Article 5 on printed page 28 required prior approval by the provincial Finance Department together with the responsible department before appropriations for new county undertakings could enter a budget. Articles 7–8 placed the aggregation, classification, and prescribed form of county budgets within a reviewable administrative sequence. Articles 10–11 on printed page 29 restricted the contingency reserve and its use; article 12 required expenditure to follow the approved budget rather than new extra-budgetary spending. These rules distinguish local revenue collection, county budget preparation, provincial authorization, and disbursement. They do not demonstrate that any particular county received a provincial subvention, used its reserve, or paid for a completed road.[9]
The provincial approval chain can also be observed in named meeting decisions rather than inferred solely from general rules. The May 1933 Zhejiang Provincial Government Administrative Report, printed page 10, records approval at the 578th provincial-government meeting on 2 May of the Finance Commissioner's proposal for provisional county-budget rules. Printed page 11 records approval at the 582nd meeting on 19 May of a separate proposal to abolish the Deqing County Finance Bureau and have the county government handle its duties through an internal section. The former is evidence of the rulemaking decision, while the latter is evidence of a county-specific organizational decision. Neither minute proves that Deqing actually closed the bureau, transferred staff, changed its tax receipts, or executed the approved arrangement; those propositions require county-level follow-up orders and accounts.[9]
The Ministry of the Interior's 1933 Zhejiang county survey received returns from 67 of 76 counties. Its tax-receipt table classified 23, 24, and 20 counties, respectively, and reported an aggregate of 17,537,363 yuan across those 67 responding counties—not a province-wide audited fiscal total. Other expenditure and autonomy-ratio tables used distinct populations of 22 and 64 counties; their numerators and denominators cannot be merged into a single representative county average. Separately, the provincial highway schedule listed 30 counties, 191 roads, 1,734.705 kilometers, and a printed construction-cost total of 496,635.960 yuan. The note printed on page 37 defines a county-operated reporting scope that excludes commercially operated and provincially operated roads but includes privately financed roads not intended for profit. This is not an inventory of every road in Zhejiang. The printed Jiaxing county subtotal is 55,872.980 yuan; a provisional non-blind nine-entry sum of 56,272.980 yuan suggested a 400-yuan difference, and the final 400.000-yuan amount is legible within the Jiaxing group; the printed county subtotal equals the other eight numeric entries excluding that amount, but the reason for its exclusion has not been established, while provisional county-level transcriptions remain unreconciled; no adjusted county subtotal is used here. Neither the road-cost schedule nor the survey establishes county-treasury disbursements, project acceptance, or final audited accounts. The evidence therefore supports an institutional comparison of reporting and approval channels, not a quantitative ranking of county fiscal performance.[10][11]
The fourth 1935 issue of the Zhejiang Civil Administration Monthly contains statistics with distinct administrative units and reference years. Table 7 (printed p. 8) groups 75 counties into six monthly administrative-funding tiers, with county counts of 1, 24, 26, 3, 18 and 3 (total 75). These are scheduled monthly administrative amounts, not evidence that all 75 counties received cash or submitted audited annual accounts; this coverage cannot simply be equated with the 76-county frame in another survey. Table 8 (printed p. 9) separately aggregates 431 districts, 58 urban wards, 11,325 rural townships, 1,223 towns, 174,026 neighborhood units (lü) and 872,188 smaller neighbor units (lin). They are nested administrative categories, not interchangeable counts of self-governing corporations; their totals do not establish elections, independent taxing authority or executed budgets. Table 15, printed page 18, records 13,797 original police positions, 1,887 reductions and 11,910 remaining positions for 1933. Table 16, printed page 19, is headed “Comparison of Zhejiang Land and Water Police Strength in Republican Year 22” (1933), consistent with the contents listing: 10,208 land police and 1,702 water police, totaling 11,910. Tables 15 and 16 therefore provide differently classified 1933 cross-sectional counts; their agency coverage has not been independently matched. Identical totals do not independently validate each other, establish year-on-year change, or justify addition. Table 29, by contrast, records able-bodied male population for year 21 (1932), not a count of county troops.[15]
Table 7 (printed p. 8) also specifies nominal monthly administrative-funding amounts for its six county groups: 6,162, 1,400, 1,184, 1,048, 1,105 and 977.5 yuan, respectively. Weighting these figures by the printed county counts of 1, 24, 26, 3, 18 and 3 yields an arithmetic monthly total of 96,512.5 yuan. If the published group amounts were the schedules applicable to each county in the corresponding tier, this would be a nominal scheduled total for seventy-five counties, not proof of appropriations released, receipts in county treasuries, or expenditure. The table provides no county-by-county remittance, adjustment, arrears, or final-account records, and multiplying the nominal monthly sum by twelve would not establish actual annual spending. The analytic ledger must distinguish scheduled amounts, administratively approved appropriations, and cash disbursements rather than treating a funding classification as implemented fiscal autonomy.[15]
A separate internal-consistency check is required for Tables 15 and 16 in the fourth 1935 issue of the Zhejiang Civil Administration Monthly. Table 15, printed page 18, gives 13,797 original police positions, 1,887 reductions, and 11,910 remaining positions; the integer identity 13,797 − 1,887 = 11,910 holds. Yet the printed percentage row gives 13.83 percent reduced and 86.17 percent remaining, whereas division by the printed 13,797 total yields approximately 13.68 and 86.32 percent. The discrepancy is unresolved: the source percentages must not be silently corrected, and an alternative denominator must not be invented. Table 16, printed page 19, is headed “Comparison of Zhejiang Land and Water Police Strength in Republican Year 22,” with 10,208 land police and 1,702 water police, whose printed 85.71 and 14.29 percent shares agree with the 11,910 total. The Wikimedia Commons catalog description instead labels Table 16 as a county police-positions comparison; this metadata title differs from the original printed table heading, although both identify Republican year 22 (1933). Without agency-level compilation records, matching totals do not prove identical coverage, and the Table 15 percentage mismatch does not establish a real change in police staffing.[15]
A denominator-sensitivity test of Table 15 rules out a simple explanation based only on rounding percentages to two decimal places. If the 1,887 abolished police posts represented the printed 13.83 percent, the possible integer denominator under ordinary two-decimal rounding would lie roughly between 13,640 and 13,649. If the 11,910 remaining posts represented the printed 86.17 percent, the corresponding denominator would instead be approximately 13,821–13,822. These intervals do not overlap. Using the printed initial establishment of 13,797 as a common denominator yields approximately 13.68 and 86.32 percent, respectively. This arithmetic finding establishes an unresolved inconsistency between the reported counts and percentages, not whether the cause was category definition, transcription, typesetting, or some other compilation practice. Original administrative worksheets would be needed before attributing the discrepancy to concealment or misconduct.[15]
Although Table 29 appeared in the fourth 1935 issue of the Zhejiang Civil Administration Monthly, its printed heading explicitly identifies Republican year 21 (1932) as the observation year. Earlier inspection of printed pages 35–36 (PDF zero-based pages 41–42) recorded 3,737,176, 5,041 and 9,684 under the printed categories ordinary households (普通戶), boat households (船戶), and temples (寺廟), respectively, summing to 3,751,901 registered able-bodied males (zhuangding). The printed male-population denominator is 11,195,392 and the reported share is 33.51 percent (33.5129 percent when recalculated from the totals). This is a historical registration statistic, not a count of trained soldiers, serving troops, county armed formations or actual conscripts. Its 1932 denominator cannot be directly combined with the 1933 police positions in Table 15, the 1933 land-and-water police comparison in Table 16, or 1933 road-construction and county-fiscal data; even where observation years coincide, institutional scope and denominator remain to be independently established. County coverage, the age definition of zhuangding and the registration-category rules remain to be checked against the compilation instructions. Grade A covers only the printed heading, totals and percentage; military and implementation inferences are unverified.[15]
Table 17 of the fourth 1935 issue of the Zhejiang Civil Administration Monthly is headed “Statistical Table of Firearms and Ammunition in Zhejiang Water and Land Public Security Agencies,” and dated June of Republican year 23 (June 1934), not 1933. Earlier inspection of printed pages 19–20 (PDF zero-based pages 25–26) recorded a total of 13,203 firearms and 1,487,121 rounds in the continuation table. The entries span provincial public-security offices, water-police units and county institutions; the total cannot be assigned to one county or equated with army strength or military command. The June 1934 weapons inventory, the 1933 police positions in Table 15, the 1933 land-and-water police comparison in Table 16, and the 1932 demographic registration in Table 29 are different observation periods and populations. A weapons-per-officer ratio or an inference of militarization requires matching agencies, dates, coverage and original inventory registers. Grade A covers the previously inspected title, date and totals only; actual issue, serviceability and command arrangements remain unverified.[15]
Table 17 of the 1933 Zhejiang Provincial Highway Statistics lists 191 roads on printed pages 31–37. A page count yields 27, 29, 29, 31, 28, 26 and 21 rows, reconciling to 191 across 30 county groups; the 400-yuan entry on page 31 belongs to Xindeng county, as cross-checked against the original page. All 191 construction-cost entries have now been independently re-transcribed by a second operator working without the earlier provisional figures. The eighteen printed county subtotals sum to exactly 496,635.960 yuan — the printed provincial total, with no residual — and entry-level sums match the printed subtotals in seventeen of the eighteen groups, the two exceptions being Jiaxing and Wukang (next paragraph). The 9,398.600-yuan gap found at an earlier stage of this research between the printed total and a provisional transcription of the county subtotals is thereby resolved: it arose from transcription errors in the provisional coding (for example, the Yuyao subtotal), not from the printed source, whose subtotal-to-total arithmetic is exact. Internal consistency of the printed figures, however, proves only the table's arithmetic: the 1,734.705 kilometres of total reported road length are not a demonstrated cost-matched denominator, and the reported costs are not county-treasury payments.[11]
Entry-by-entry comparison under the independent re-transcription locates exactly two inconsistencies among the eighteen groups with printed subtotals. The visible Jiaxing amounts sum to 56,272.980 yuan; the final 400.000-yuan entry is legible within the Jiaxing group, and the remaining amounts sum exactly to the printed county subtotal of 55,872.980 yuan. This arithmetic pattern does not establish why the final entry was excluded from the printed subtotal or that the original was misprinted. Jiaxing's final 400-yuan road and the earlier 400-yuan road listed under Xindeng are distinct printed entries and must not be reassigned to one county. Seven Wukang amounts across pages 32–33 sum to 5,790, 300 below the printed 6,090, and the specific entry or convention behind that shortfall cannot be located. The other sixteen groups — including four Lanxi amounts summing to 20,018.410 and the two stated Nantian amounts summing to 3,000 — match their printed subtotals exactly. The two differences net to plus 100 yuan, and the sum of all stated entries is 496,735.960 yuan. The re-transcription was performed independently by a second operator and checked group by group against the printed subtotals; grouped-cost attribution follows the original layout. This arithmetic verification establishes neither a printing error nor county-treasury disbursement.[11]
Among thirty county groups in Table 17, twelve have blank printed county-cost subtotals. The independent re-transcription confirms that those twelve groups contain fifty-five road entries, all fifty-five with no stated construction cost. The other eighteen groups contain 136 road entries, some with no individually stated amount and some covered by amounts combined across rows. A blank printed cell means only that no amount was stated there; it does not establish zero construction cost, an absence of fundraising, or zero county-treasury spending. Because the eighteen printed subtotals sum exactly to the printed provincial aggregate, no unexplained gap remains between the county subtotals and the provincial total; the unstated costs of the blank groups nevertheless cannot be recovered from the total, and grouped-cost allocation, subtotal conventions, and compilation rules still require the original compilation records. These are a second operator's independent re-transcription and classification of the printed records, not cash-account evidence.[11]
The three notes printed below the 1933 Zhejiang county-road schedule on page 37 establish its compilation procedure rather than merely its totals. Note 1 identifies county-submitted “new-style road survey forms” and files held by the provincial Construction Department as inputs; note 2 states that differing original distance and measurement units were converted to kilometres and metres; note 3 excludes commercial and provincial roads from the county-operated category while including privately financed roads not intended for profit. The reported 1,734.705 kilometres are thus a compiled and unit-harmonized figure, not a length independently surveyed for this paper; the printed 496,635.960 yuan is a reported construction-cost total, not proof of county-treasury payment. None of these three notes establishes a common completion cutoff for all 191 road entries. The 1933 publication date and a 2026 scholar’s footnote cannot replace road-by-road chronology. This run directly inspected the original printed notes and totals (grade A for their wording), while county-cost attribution and actual disbursement remain unverified.[11][17]
The reporting date of the road schedule also requires source criticism: publication in 1933 does not by itself establish that all listed roads were built in 1933. A footnote available on the journal webpage for Xu Yang's 2026 study interprets the approximately 1,735 kilometres on printed page 37 of the 1933 Zhejiang Highway Statistics as county-operated road mileage reached by 1932. The same note describes county-road financing as potentially combining county public funds, surtaxes, donations, and advances from merchants. This is a later scholar's publicly accessible footnote and abstract (grade C), not a fresh inspection of the article's paywalled full text or independent confirmation of a common observation cut-off for all 191 original road entries. A defensible project-level test must therefore establish the schedule's reporting cut-off, each road's construction period, and separate receipts, merchant advances, reported costs, and actual county-treasury payments. Neither the 1933 publication year nor the printed construction-cost total can be treated as a uniform 1933 construction flow or county-budget outlay.[11][17]
The 1933 Provisional Rules on Rewards and Sanctions for Zhejiang County Magistrates in Road Construction (Zhejiang Civil Administration Monthly, vol. 3, issues 3–4, printed p. 45) linked county road administration to provincial personnel supervision. Article 2 identified timely completion, labor requisition (徵工), road fundraising, contracting amid fiscal difficulty, and mobilization for rural roads as possible grounds for reward; Article 3 addressed delay, deficient labor requisition or fundraising, and improper administration or supervision causing work stoppage or waste. Article 4 listed four awards: merit credit, certificates, medals, and promotion. Article 5 allocated decision authority: merit credit was determined jointly by the Construction and Civil Administration Departments, whereas certificates, medals, and promotion required those departments to submit the matter to the provincial government. Article 6 ordinarily required year-end assessment but permitted special-case action by the Construction Department. The original term 徵工 denotes a requisition or organized call for labor, not voluntary charity work; the regulation alone does not establish that coercive recruitment occurred in a particular county. The rules document a supervisory design, not any actual award, sanction, road completion, or treasury disbursement.[9]
Table 5 in the 1935 Zhejiang Civil Administration Monthly reports four separate measures of county-magistrate rewards and sanctions for 1933: occurrences, counties, persons, and cases. Occurrences of major merit, ordinary merit and commendation were 13, 33 and 9; occurrences of dismissal, demotion, major demerit, ordinary demerit and reprimand were 1, 2, 94, 86 and 91. Occurrences cannot be read as unique recipients, and county counts cannot be summed across categories without deduplication. More importantly, the table does not classify awards or penalties by road-building cause. It therefore cannot demonstrate that the separate 1933 road-construction reward/discipline rules were enforced in any particular county. Testing implementation requires matching named personnel orders, road projects, terms of office and dates.[15]
VI. The U.S. Federal Highway Act as a Non-Equivalent Comparator
The 1921 Federal Highway Act separated four administrative stages rather than treating an appropriation as a completed road. Section 21 first permitted a deduction of up to 2.5 percent for administration and research, then apportioned the remainder by equal thirds for state area, population, and rural-delivery/star-route mileage, with a minimum 0.5 percent state allotment. Under Sections 10 and 11, governor-certified compliance made an allotment available; a separate project submission, approval of plans and estimates, and Treasury reservation identified a potential federal project share. Sections 12 and 13 assigned execution and supervision to the state highway department, subject to federal inspection and payment conditioned on compliant work or verified progress. Section 14 created a separate maintenance-enforcement procedure after construction, and Section 19 required annual reporting of projects, allocations, receipts, and itemized expenditure. Sections 2 and 7 permitted locally raised contributions to count as state funds only under direct state highway department control, while Section 6's seven-percent rule defined the eligible road system, not its completion rate. Each stage leaves a different documentary trace; none alone establishes that a county received payment. These grant rules also do not make U.S. states and ROC counties constitutionally equivalent.[12]
The payment distinction in Section 13 is especially important: final payment followed federal verification of construction to approved plans and specifications, while discretionary progress payments could not exceed the federal pro rata share of labor and materials actually incorporated. Treasury disbursement required an Agriculture Department warrant and a recipient authorized under state law. These provisions establish conditions for payment, not evidence that a particular payment occurred.[12]
Cross-system road comparisons require a prior test of statutory definitions and eligibility. Section 2 of the U.S. Federal Highway Act of 1921 included rights of way, bridges, drainage structures, signs, and protective works within “highway,” but generally excluded streets or highways in municipalities of at least 2,500 inhabitants under the latest available census; a specified exception covered portions along which houses averaged more than 200 feet apart within one mile. Section 8 required durable surfacing and materials appropriate to present and probable traffic. Section 9 made roads built or rebuilt under the Act toll-free and generally required a wearing surface of at least eighteen feet on subsequently built primary or interstate highways, subject to the Secretary of Agriculture’s exceptions for physical conditions, excessive costs, traffic needs, or legal obstacles. Zhejiang’s 1933 county-operated road schedule instead excluded provincial and commercial roads while including non-profit privately financed roads. The two sources have not been shown to share a denominator for road type, urban inclusion, engineering standard, or reporting entity. The reported 191 roads and 1,734.705 kilometres cannot therefore be divided by U.S. federal-aid mileage to infer comparative coverage, fiscal efficiency, or local autonomy.[11][12]
The 1921 Federal Highway Act also imposes a cost-definition constraint. Section 2 defined “construction” to include supervision, inspection, actual building, and incidental expenses, but expressly excluded locating, surveying, mapping, and the costs of rights of way. It separately defined “reconstruction” as widening or rebuilding a highway to produce a continuous road of sufficient width and strength. Section 11 limited the engineering, inspection, and unforeseen-contingency items included in project estimates to ten percent of estimated construction cost. These were definitions and estimate controls for federal-aid projects, not a universal classification of all state highway expenditure. No inspected Zhejiang account establishes that “construction cost” in its 1933 county-road schedule excluded the same categories. Without matched project ledgers, accounting classifications, and payment vouchers, nominally similar cost headings cannot support a cross-country unit-cost or efficiency calculation.[11][12]
Section 11 generally capped the federal amount set aside for an approved project at 50 percent of its estimated cost. For states with unappropriated public lands exceeding 5 percent of total state area, it permitted an additional federal percentage equal to one-half the unappropriated-public-land percentage, together with a proportional adjustment to the existing per-mile payment limit. This 50-percent figure governed the estimated federal share of an individual project. It was neither Section 6’s 60-percent ceiling on the distribution of a state’s federal-aid allotment between road classes nor evidence of payment under Section 13. Actual disbursement requires comparison with approved estimates, work records and Treasury warrants; these statutory ratios cannot be applied to infer Zhejiang county-road financing in 1933.[12]
Section 12 placed federally aided construction, reconstruction, contracts, plans, specifications, and estimates with state highway departments, subject to the Secretary of Agriculture’s approval. Work was governed by state law, directly supervised by the state highway department, and subject to federal inspection and approval. Section 14 addressed a separate postconstruction duty: after federal notice of deficient maintenance, a state had ninety days to restore the highway to proper condition. If it failed, the federal government could arrange maintenance, charge the cost against the state’s federal allotment, and suspend approval of further state projects. Reimbursement by the state returned the federal expenditure to the highway fund for reapportionment and permitted renewed project approvals under the statute. Sections 12–14 therefore establish a sequence of state execution, federal verification, conditional disbursement, and maintenance accountability; they do not demonstrate that any particular state underwent federal repairs or that Zhejiang counties completed roads or made treasury payments. The Deqing resolution shows a provincial-government decision about the organizational form of a named county finance office. Section 12 of the 1921 U.S. Act, by contrast, kept project execution and direct supervision with the state highway department while requiring federal approval of plans, specifications, and estimates. A provincial decision to reorganize a county office is not the same legal power as federal conditional review of a state-administered project. Institutional organization, budget authorization, engineering supervision, and payment authority must therefore be compared separately.[9][12]
The 1921 Federal Highway Act also created accounting and disclosure duties independent of any single project payment. Section 4 directed the Secretary of Agriculture to establish an accounting division to devise and install a method of keeping accounts. Section 15 required a map of selected and approved primary, secondary, and forest roads within two years after the Act took effect, followed by supplementary maps at least annually. Section 19 required an annual report to Congress by the first Monday in December, covering project status, allocation of appropriations, itemized receipts and expenditures for the preceding fiscal year, and personnel and travel expenses. These were three different statutory record-producing duties: an accounting system, a geographic project inventory, and legislative reporting. For Zhejiang, the corresponding evidentiary search should distinguish county returns, provincial construction files, cash ledgers, and annual project lists. The U.S. duties do not by themselves establish compliance with reporting deadlines, nor do they demonstrate that Zhejiang maintained equivalent records.[11][12]
Section 2 of the U.S. Federal Highway Act of 1921 defines “State funds” to include money raised by a state or its political subdivisions only when it is made available for expenditure under the direct control of the state highway department. Section 7 ordinarily required states to provide the matching funds needed each year for construction, reconstruction and maintenance before federal project approval, subject to the time-limited transitional provision in Section 24. Section 6 also required each state to designate a federal-aid highway system not exceeding seven percent of its total highway mileage and to distinguish primary or interstate from secondary or intercounty roads. These provisions separate local revenue raising, state project control and federal eligibility. In Zhejiang in 1933, counties might raise money or execute works while provincial fiscal and subject-matter departments retained approval of new public-work budgets. The valid comparison is the procedural allocation of funding and approval authority, not a claim that a U.S. state highway department and a Zhejiang county were constitutionally equivalent federal members.[9][12]
Section 6 also imposed a conditional allocation rule within a state: until provision had been made for improving the whole primary or interstate highway system, no more than 60 percent of federal aid allotted to the state was generally to be spent on primary or interstate highways. With the state highway department's approval, however, the Secretary of Agriculture could authorize expenditure above that threshold. This 60-percent figure governed the distribution of a state's federal-aid allotment between road classes, not the federal reimbursement percentage for an individual project. It differs in denominator and condition from the seven-percent ceiling on the designated system's share of total state highway mileage and the three-sevenths ceiling on primary-system mileage. None can be added together or used to estimate Zhejiang county-road expenditure.[12]
Section 7's funding prerequisite was not absolute. Section 24 of the 1921 Federal Highway Act directed the Secretary of Agriculture to continue approving projects for three years after enactment in a state whose existing constitution or laws did not permit it to raise revenue for highway construction, reconstruction, or maintenance, provided the Secretary found that the state had complied as far as those laws allowed. This was a temporary accommodation for state-law financing constraints, not a permanent exemption from matching obligations, proof that any particular state invoked the exception, or evidence of a federal disbursement. A comparison with Zhejiang's 1933 provincial approval of county budgets must therefore distinguish the ordinary U.S. matching prerequisite from this transitional approval pathway and test actual practice against state law, federal compliance determinations, project approvals, and payment records.[12]
Section 21 adds a temporal distinction between an apportioned federal allotment and expenditure. Funds apportioned under the 1921 Act generally remained available until the close of the second succeeding fiscal year; amounts still unexpended at the end of that period were to be reapportioned among the states within sixty days under the statutory formula. Section 22 separately specified certification of administrative deductions and state apportionments to Treasury and the state highway departments. An annual allotment notice therefore cannot establish final receipt or project expenditure without checking project reservations, state receipts, progress-payment warrants, and any later reapportionment. Zhejiang’s 1933 county-road schedule did not operate under that U.S. federal fiscal-year mechanism, and its printed construction-cost figures cannot be treated as the same accounting measure.[11][12]
Section 23 of the U.S. Federal Highway Act of 1921 established a separate forest-roads-and-trails funding channel, distinct from ordinary state-administered federal-aid highways. Subsection 23(b) allowed, but did not require, the Secretary of Agriculture to accept cooperation from territories, states, and their civil subdivisions; subsection 23(c) authorized construction, reconstruction, and maintenance contracts directly with a territory, state, or civil subdivision. A local government could therefore be a contractual counterparty for this special forest-road program without becoming a constituent member of the federal union. This contractual route must not be generalized to the ordinary state-highway funding and approval regime in sections 6–14. Comparison with Zhejiang's 1933 “county-operated” road schedule requires separate proof of road category, statutory contracting authority, source of funds, and payee before inferring county autonomy.[11][12]
VII. The 1947 Constitutional Settlement
These 1947 constitutional allocations are later normative arrangements; they must not be projected backward as evidence that Zhejiang counties exercised the same powers, elected magistrates, or made treasury payments in 1933. [13]
The 1947 Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC) differentiated central, provincial, and county competences. Article 107 reserved specified matters to central legislation and administration; article 108 allowed centrally legislated matters to be implemented locally; articles 109 and 110 assigned provincial and county matters, including finance and public works; and article 111 assigned unenumerated matters by territorial character. Articles 121–127 separately prescribed county self-government, elected county councils and magistrates, and the execution of delegated duties. Article 126's elected magistrate differed in legal design from Zhejiang's 1921 gubernatorial appointment; neither text establishes the actual frequency of county elections or the use of county funds. In the United States, the Tenth Amendment does not make counties constituent states, and Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh (1907), a municipal-consolidation dispute, cannot be generalized into a complete rule for all county powers or proprietary interests. Articles 107(5), 108(9), 109(1) and (6), and 110(1) and (5) distinguish national highways, interprovincial transport, provincial public works, and county works. Article 111 governs only unenumerated matters. These categories do not prove who actually paid for construction within county borders. Constitutional competences must be distinguished from the approval, payment, and audit of individual projects.[5][13][14]
The 1947 ROC Constitution also specified provincial—not merely county—executive selection. Article 112 contemplated a provincial assembly framing provincial self-government regulations consistent with the Constitution; Article 113 prescribed popularly elected provincial councillors and a governor elected by the people of the province. Articles 124 and 126 separately prescribed elected county councillors and county magistrates, while Article 127 still required magistrates to execute central and provincial delegated business. Popular election and delegated administration could therefore coexist in the constitutional design. These provisions do not establish that provincial governors were actually elected throughout the country, nor may they be projected backward onto Zhejiang’s 1921 constitutional scheme or its 1933 county-magistrate road-discipline rules.[5][9][13]
Fiscal percentages also require matched numerators and denominators. Article 110 of Zhejiang’s 1921 provincial constitution prescribed a minimum twenty-percent share for provincial education expenditure against the provincial budget. Article 164 of the 1947 ROC Constitution instead set minimum shares for the combined fields of education, scientific studies, and cultural services: fifteen percent of the national budget, twenty-five percent of provincial budgets, and thirty-five percent of municipal or county budgets. The later provision therefore covers a broader spending category and several levels of government. A nominal twenty-five-versus-twenty comparison cannot demonstrate an actual increase in provincial education spending; nor can the thirty-five-percent county requirement establish that Zhejiang county treasuries in 1933 controlled equivalent resources. Comparable accounting classifications, budget bases, legal effect, and final accounts remain necessary.[5][13]
The 1947 ROC Constitution differentiated transport and police powers more precisely than a general label of local public works suggests. Article 107(5) assigned national highways to central legislation and administration, while Article 108(9) covered transport extending across more than one province under central legislation with possible local implementation. Articles 109(1) and (6) assigned provincial transport and engineering; Articles 110(1) and (5) assigned county transport and engineering. Article 107(7) reserved the demarcation of national, provincial, and county tax revenues to the center, while Articles 109(7) and 110(6) addressed provincial and county finance and taxes. Article 108(17) addressed the police system; Articles 109(10) and 110(9) separately assigned provincial police implementation and county guard functions (rendered “hsien police and defense” in the official presidential English translation). Article 127 required magistrates to perform county self-government as well as centrally and provincially delegated tasks. These distinctions concern normative authority, not proof of Zhejiang road expenditures or police deployments in 1933.[13]
The 1947 settlement distinguished disputes over competences, constitutional review, and the hierarchy of legislation. Article 111 placed disputes about unenumerated powers before the Legislative Yuan. Under article 114, provincial self-government laws had to be submitted to the Judicial Yuan, which could declare unconstitutional provisions invalid. Article 115 provided for hearings convened by the Judicial Yuan when implementation of a provincial self-government law encountered a major obstacle, followed by a proposed solution from a committee comprising the presidents of the five Yuans. Article 116 invalidated provincial regulations conflicting with national law; article 117 assigned the Judicial Yuan interpretation of disputed conflicts; and article 125 invalidated county regulations conflicting with national law or provincial regulations. These procedures neither constitute nor replace ordinary project approval. The fiscal provisions also answer different questions. Article 109 allowed national-treasury subsidies, upon a Legislative Yuan resolution, when a province lacked funds for its enumerated responsibilities. Article 147 separately required appropriately calibrated central assistance to disadvantaged provinces and provincial assistance to disadvantaged counties. To infer actual county receipts or expenditure, one must follow the evidentiary chain from statutory competence and budget authorization through administrative execution, transfer vouchers, and final accounts; the constitutional duty alone cannot establish a particular road payment.[10][11][13]
Article 164 of the 1947 ROC Constitution set minimum budget shares for education, science, and culture at 15 percent of the central government's total budget, 25 percent of provincial budgets, and 35 percent of municipal and county budgets, respectively. Article 163 separately called for national-treasury support for education and culture in remote and impoverished areas. These duties differ from Article 147's appropriately calibrated assistance for economically disadvantaged provinces and counties: budget prioritization, education support, and economic equalization are not interchangeable road-construction grants. Zhejiang's 1921 provincial constitution had set a 20-percent provincial-budget expenditure floor for education in Article 110. The two rules differ in date, governmental tier, denominator, and legal effect. Subtracting Zhejiang's 1921 provincial 20 percent from the 1947 municipal/county 35 percent cannot establish a fifteen-percentage-point improvement in county fiscal autonomy. Comparable evidence would require matching budget units, accounting categories, and actual implementation records.[5][13]
Article 148’s protection of the domestic circulation of goods is distinct from the allocation of taxing and spending competences in articles 107–111. A national-market guarantee alone does not establish any county’s budget autonomy. Treating the two as separate legal questions avoids mistaking trade freedom for local fiscal independence.[13]
VIII. Interpretation and Conclusion
The historical problem is not reducible to excessive provincial power or excessive centralization. Across the 1909 local-government regulations, the 1921 provincial constitution, the 1923 national constitution, the 1931 tutelage instrument, the unadopted 1936 draft, and the 1947 ROC Constitution, local functions, fiscal authority, executive accountability, and superior administrative command were repeatedly recombined. Zhejiang's 1933 records make the institutional mechanism more concrete: when revenue, budget approval, construction, appointments, and audit were divided among tiers, a county could possess duties without the full instruments needed to discharge and answer for them. A superior authority could approve a project without bearing its costs or maintenance obligations. This fragmentation made performance difficult to identify and responsibility easy to displace.
Three limits constrain this cross-system comparison. First, Zhejiang's provincial-treasury audit provisions and the 1933 county-road construction-cost schedule concern different accounting subjects. Second, U.S. state matching funds, statutory apportionment, and project reimbursement are not direct measures of county self-government. Third, the 1923 national constitution, the unadopted 1936 draft, and the 1947 constitution differ in legal status. The comparable unit is therefore the procedural chain identifying who could propose, approve, finance, execute, account for, and answer for a project, not a nominal equivalence among provinces, counties, and states. Claims about performance require project-level matching of legal authority, budget decisions, treasury vouchers, and acceptance records.
Legal competences, administrative road statistics, and treasury vouchers answer distinct questions. Provincial and national constitutional texts assign authority; county road schedules report the scope of recorded works; actual disbursement requires accounts and payment evidence. The 1921 U.S. grant system offers a procedural comparator for approval, disbursement, and maintenance accountability rather than a ready-made design for China. Whether the 1947 ROC Constitution drew directly on Zhejiang’s 1921 constitution requires draft variants and drafting records. The operative test of local self-government is the alignment of assigned competences, usable revenues, democratic authorization, administrative oversight, and auditable implementation. Local election practice and county disbursements remain archival questions.[11][12][13]
The argument is falsifiable at the project level. A matched county-road dossier containing council authorization, provincial budget approval, revenue ledgers, construction contracts, acceptance certificates, and treasury vouchers would permit a test of whether formal responsibility aligned with control over resources and implementation. Administrative rules or aggregate road schedules alone cannot supply that missing causal evidence. A rival explanation is that provincial budget review may have supplied technical scrutiny or coordination across counties rather than merely imposing delay. Comparing otherwise similar road projects by financing source, county capacity, approval sequence, and completion records would be needed to distinguish obstructive supervision from beneficial coordination. This article identifies a testable institutional mechanism; it does not claim to have estimated the causal effect of approval authority on road outcomes.
参考文献与史料等级 / References and Source Status
[1] 1909《城鎮鄉地方自治章程》，历史转录，B：https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/城鎮鄉地方自治章程 。
[2] 1912《中華民國臨時約法》，历史法律文本。原始扫描：https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NLC416-13jh001746-47256_中華民國臨時約法.pdf 。
[3] 湖南省议会1922年5月20日通电、6月17日宣言，历史转录，B：https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/湖南省議會應付時局主張聯省主義宣言 。
[4] 孙中山1924《建國大綱》，历史转录，B：https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/建國大綱 。
[5] 1921《浙江省宪法》及施行法，《浙江省法匯編》原印部分条文已核，其他B：https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NLC416-12jh003053-43593_浙江省法匯編.pdf 。
[6] 1923《中華民國憲法》，擷華印書局原印第35—37页，第128条第2—6款已据原印核验，规范文本证据A级：第2款县长直选附司法独立及下级自治完成条件；第3款县留成省税不超过十分之四；第4款保护县财产及自治经费；第5款灾害或经费不足补助须经省务院及省议会议决，由省库支付；第6款县须遵行国家与省的法律。A级仅指原印法条，不证明补助支付或选举实施。原印：https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NLC416-11jh007322-56095_中華民國憲法.pdf 。历史英文转录：https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_China_(1923) 。
[7] 1931《中華民國訓政時期約法》，历史转录，B：https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/中華民國訓政時期約法 。
[8] 1936《五五憲草》，未施行草案，历史转录，B：https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/五五憲草 。
[9] 1933《浙江民政月刊》第3卷第3—4期，《浙江省各縣縣長築路獎懲暫行規程》，原印第45页，原影：https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NLC404-01J002066-24509_浙江民政月刊_1933年3卷3–04期.pdf ；第3卷第5—6期，《浙江省各縣編制地方預算暫行辦法》，原印第28—29页（PDF零基34—35），原影：https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NLC404-01J002066-24510_浙江民政月刊_1933年3卷5–06期.pdf ；《浙江省政府行政報告》1933年第5期，原印第10—11页（PDF零基18、20），省政府第578次、第582次会议议决摘要，原影：https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NLC404-01J001967-52459_浙江省政府行政報告_1933年5期.pdf 。A级仅限本轮直接目视核读的上述原印条款、议决及既有已核规程条款；会议通过不等于县级执行，具体县财政账册、人员任免及工程付款未核。
[10] 1933内政部《內政調查統計表》第4期，原印第1、3—6页，A：https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NLC404-01J001184-40473_內政調查統計表_1933年4期.pdf 。
[11] 1933《浙江省公路統計》第十七表，原印第31—37页；第37页合计及三项编制注释已直接核对（县填新式道路调查表与建设厅案卷、异单位换算、县营道路范围）。A级指原印影像、表头、总计与注释；全部191条建筑费已经第二操作者独立复录：18个印列县小计之和与原印总计恰合，逐笔分项仅嘉兴（多400.000元）、武康（少300.000元）两组与印列小计不一致；算术核对不据此证明县库实付。原始影印：https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NLC511-027032013015344-16332_浙江省公路統計.pdf 。
[12] U.S. Federal Highway Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 212，官方法条：https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-42/pdf/STATUTE-42-Pg212.pdf 。
[13] 1947《中華民國憲法》，中华民国总统府官方中文法条，A：https://www.president.gov.tw/Page/284/1241 ；英文官方译文：https://english.president.gov.tw/Page/94 。本文分析1947年原有条文，不将后续增修或执行事实倒写回1947年。
[14] Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907), pp. 178–180, official U.S. Reports; municipal-consolidation comparator only; the opinion reserved certain proprietary-property issues. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-207/pdf/USREPORTS-207-161.pdf 。
[15] 1935《浙江民政月刊》第5卷第4期，第7、8、15、16、17、29表（第16表原印与目录均标「二十二年度」），原印第8、9、18—20、35—36页。原印影像核验范围：第8、9、18—20、35—36页，其中第17表第20页合计与附注、第29表第36页合计已核；县别/机关别各行及统计编制说明尚未独立逐行校核。A仅限所见表题、观察年度、合计与附注；不据此证明县库实付、实际征兵、枪械配发或军令指挥。https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NLC404-01J002066-24536_浙江民政月刊_1935年5卷4期.pdf。
[16] 1912《江西省臨時約法》第3、4、8条及1911《中華民國鄂州臨時約法》第3、60条（第60条方括号文字为转录所见，原印待核），后出历史电子转录，B-TEXT；原始1912/1911刊本及实施未核。https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hans/江西省臨時約法 ；https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hans/中華民國鄂州臨時約法 。
[17] 徐杨，〈“国联”调查报告与20世纪30年代浙江新式交通建设的重估〉，《史林》2026年第1期（总220期），44—53、218页。此次仅核读期刊公开摘要及参考文献脚注（特别是县办道路约1,735公里、截至1932年、筹资渠道的脚注），未取得论文全文；C级二手线索，不替代1933原始道路表。https://lwbi.cbpt.cnki.net/portal/journal/portal/client/paper/eb48dd9c8caee4cb83c54faa982fe3d2 。
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